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Abstract
This article is about defining a suitable logic for expressing classical game
theoretical notions. We define an extension of alternating-time tempo-
ral logic (ATL) that enables us to express various rationality assumptions
of intelligent agents. Our proposal, the logic ATLP (ATL with plausibil-
ity) allows us to specify sets of rational strategy profiles in the object lan-
guage, and reason about agents’ play if only these strategy profiles were
allowed. For example, wemay assume the agents to play only Nash equi-
libria, Pareto-optimal profiles or undominated strategies, and ask about
the resulting behaviour (and outcomes) under such an assumption. The
logic also gives rise to generalized versions of classical solution concepts
through characterizing patterns of payoffs by suitably parameterized for-
mulae ofATLP.We investigate the complexity ofmodel checkingATLP
for several classes of formulae: It ranges from ∆P3 to PSPACE in the
general case and from∆P3 to∆P4 for themost interesting subclasses, and
roughly corresponds to solving extensive games with imperfect informa-
tion.
Keywords: game theory,modal and temporal logic, reasoning about agents,
rationality.
1 Introduction
Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) [2, 3] is a temporal logic that incorpo-
rates some basic game theoretical notions. In ATL we can express that a
group of agents is able to bring aboutψ, i.e., they are able to ensure a situation
where ψ holds whatever the other agents might do. However, such a state-
ment is weaker than it seems. Often, we know that agents behave according
to some rationality assumptions, they are not completely dumb. Therefore
we do not have to check all possible plays – only those that are plausible in
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some reasonable sense. This has striking similarities to nonmonotonic rea-
soning, where one considers default rules that describe themost plausible be-
haviour and allow to draw conclusions when knowledge is incomplete.
In general, plausibility can be seen as a broader notion than rationality:
One may obtain plausibility specifications e.g. from learning or folk knowl-
edge. In this article, however, we mostly focus on plausibility as rationality
in a game-theoretical sense.
Our idea has been inspired by the way in which games are analyzed in
game theory. Firstly, game theory identifies a number of solution concepts
(e.g., Nash equilibrium, undominated strategies, Pareto optimality) that can
be used to define rational behaviour of players. Secondly, we usually assume
that players play rationally in the sense of one of the above concepts, and we
ask about the outcome of the game under this assumption.
Solution concepts do not only help to determine the right decision for an
agent. Perhaps more importantly, they constrain the possible (predicted) re-
sponses of the opponents to a proper subset of all the possibilities. For many
games the number of all possible outcomes is infinite, althoughonly someof
them, often finitely many, make sense. We need a notion of rationality (like
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium) to discard the less sensible ones, and to
determine what should happen had the game been played by ideal players.
1.1 Idea andMain Results
While ATL is already a logic that incorporates some game theoretical con-
cepts, we claim that extendingATLbyother useful constructs not onlyhelps
us to better understand the classical solution concepts in game theory, but
it also paves the way for defining new solution concepts (which we call gen-
eral). We extendATL by the notion of plausibility, and call the resulting logic
ATLP. We claim that this logic is suitable to model and to reason about the
rational behaviour of agents.
In this article we discuss the following:
1. We recall from [5, 30] that models ofATL, called concurrent game struc-
tures (CGS), embed extensive form games with perfect information in a nat-
ural way. This can be done, e.g., by adding auxiliary propositions to the
CGS, that describe the payoffs of agents. With this perspective, concur-
rent game structures can be seen as a strict generalisation of extensive
games.
2. We discuss informally how these more general games can be “solved”,
given an appropriate solution concept that defines which plays can be
plausibly expected.
3. We extendATL to a new logicATLP that allows to reason about what
agents can achieve under an arbitrary plausibility assumption. Analy-
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sis of this kind typically starts with assuming that agents are rational in
the sense that they only play strategies consistent with a selected solu-
tion concept (e.g., they can only play Nash equilibria, or undominated
strategies etc.). Then, we can ask which outcomes can be obtained by
whom under this assumption.
4. We extend the results from [45, 30], and show that the classical solu-
tion concepts (Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, Pareto
optimality, and others) can be also characterized in the object language
of ATLP. That is, we propose expressions of ATLP that, given an ex-
tensive game, denote exactly the set of Nash equilibria (subgame per-
fect NE’s, Pareto optimal profiles, etc.) in that game. In consequence,
ATLP can serve both as a language for reasoning about rational play,
and for specifying what rational play is. We point out that these char-
acterizations extend traditional solution concepts to the more general
class ofmulti-stagemulti-player games definedby concurrent game struc-
tures.
5. We also propose an alternative approach to defining solution concepts
for games that involve infinite flow of time. In the new approach, path
formulae of ATL are used to specify the “winning conditions” of each
player. This implicitly leads to a normal form game with binary pay-
offs, where the traditional solution concepts are well defined. We also
demonstrate how these “qualitative” solution concepts (parametrized
byATL path formulae) can be characterized inATLP.
6. We constructively show that several logics canbe embedded intoATLP.
That is, we demonstrate how models and formulae of those logics can
be (independently) transformed to their ATLP counterparts in a way
that preserves their truth values.
7. Last but not least, we investigate themodel checkingproblem inATLP.
We show that, for different subclasses of the new logic, the complexity
ofmodel checking ranges from∆P3 -completeness toPSPACE-completeness.
We also argue that, when the number of plausible strategy profiles is
reasonably small, themodel checking can be done in polynomial time.
1.2 RelatedWork
In our approach, some strategies (or rather strategy profiles) can be assumed
plausible, andone can reasonwhat can be plausibly achieved by agents under
such an assumption. There are two possible points of focus in this context.
Researchwithin game theory understandably favorswork on characterization
of various types of rationality (and defining most appropriate solution con-
cepts). Applications of game theory, also understandably, tend toward using
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the solution concepts in order to predict the outcome in a given game (in
other words, to “solve” the game).
The first issue has been studied in the framework of logic, for example
in [4, 6, 41, 42];more recently, game-theoretical solution concepts have been
characterized in dynamic logic [21, 20], dynamic epistemic logic [5, 44], and
ATL [45, 30].
The second thread seems to have been neglected in logic-based research:
papers by VanOtterloo and his colleagues [50, 51, 49, 48] are the only excep-
tions we know of. Moreover, every proposal from [50, 51, 49, 48] commits
to a particular view of rationality (Nash equilibria, undominated strategies
etc.). In this paper, we try to generalize this kind of reasoning in a way that
allows to “plug in” any solution concept of choice. We also try to fill in the
gap between the two threads by showinghow sets of rational strategy profiles
can be specified in the object language, and building upon the existing work
onmodal logic characterizations of solution concepts [21, 20, 5, 44, 45, 30].
1.3 Structure of the Article
Webeginby introducing somebasic notions fromgame theory and the alternating-
time temporal logic (Section 2). In Section 3, we pave the way for Sections 4
and 5: We relate ATL and its semantical models to extensive games. Then
we do the same for an extension ofATL, calledATLI, which has been intro-
duced in [30] to characterize solution concepts in extensive games.
Section 4 introduces our logic ATLP: We extend ATL with a plausibility
operator. This constitutes the base language LbaseATLP. The main syntactic nov-
elty are plausibility terms that refer to rational strategies. Then, we extend the
base language by allowing to specify sets of rational strategy profiles in the ob-
ject language. To do this, we need to define a language with a much richer
structure of terms as in LbaseATLP. We achieve this by describing strategy profiles
withATLI formulae, and extending LbaseATLP so that the concepts presented in
Section 3.4 can be reused. Finally, we propose the full language LATLP where
ATLP characterizations of solution concepts are “plugged” into ATLP for-
mulae that describe the consequences of adopting this or that notion of ra-
tionality. Thus, we create a single language for both characterizing rational
behaviour and reasoning about its outcome. We define LATLP through a hi-
erarchy of sublanguages LkATLP, each allowing for more levels of plausibility
updates than the previous one.
Section 5 lists ourmain conceptual results. We showhow to embed several
logics in ATLP and how to express several classical solution concepts (such
as Nash equilibria and others) already in L1ATLP. Our third result is the gen-
eralization of Nash equilibria, Pareto optimality, undominatedness and sub-
game perfect Nash equilibria as certain parameterized formulae in the lan-
guage ofATLP.
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Section 6 contains the results of our study on the complexity of model
checking in variants ofATLP. Finally, we conclude with Section 7.
Some results reported in this article have been already presented in a pre-
liminary form in several conference and workshop papers. A rough idea of
“ATL with plausibility” was proposed in [8, 25]. In [26], we studied a more
complex language of terms that would allow to specify sets of rational strat-
egy profiles in the object language; still, the language was not expressive
enough for our purposes. Some initial complexity results were also reported
in that paper. Finally, [11] put forward the idea that rationality specifications
can be written in ATLP itself, and nested in ATLP formulae. The idea of
“qualitative” solution concept was also introduced in [11].
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce some concepts that are important for the rest of
this article. After recapitulating some machinery of game theory, together
with two running examples, we introduce ATL, which is the basis for our
new logicATLP.
2.1 Concepts FromGameTheory
We start with the definition of a normal form game, also called strategic game,
and use the terminology of [35].
Definition 1 (Normal Form (NF) Game) A (perfect information) normal
form game Γ, is a tuple of the form Γ = 〈P,A1, . . . ,Ak, µ〉, where
• P is a finite set of players (or agents), with |P| = k,
• Ai are nonempty sets of actions (or strategies) for player i,
• µ : P → (∏ki=1Ai → R) is the payoff function (which we also write
〈µ1, . . . , µk〉).
A combinations of actions (resp. strategies, payoffs), one per player, will be called
an action profile (resp. strategy profile, payoff profile) throughout the paper.
Such games are usually depictedwith a payoffmatrix. For example, a game
with 2 players having 2 strategies each is represented by the matrix in Fig-
ure 1.
Example 1 (Classical NF Games) Some classical NF games with 2 players
and 2 strategies are shown in Figure 2. In the Matching Pennies game, player
1 wins when both pennies show the same side. Otherwise player 2 wins. In the
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1\ 2 a12 a22
a11
a21
〈µ1(a11, a12),µ2(a11, a12)〉
〈µ1(a21, a22),µ2(a21, a22)〉
〈µ1(a11, a12),µ2(a11, a22)〉
〈µ1(a21, a12),µ2(a21, a22)〉
Figure 1: Payoff matrix for 2 players and 2× 2 strategies
1\ 2 Head Tail
Head
Tail
(1, -1)
(-1, 1)
(-1, 1)
(1, -1)
1\ 2 C D
C
D
(3, 3)
(5, 0)
(0, 5)
(1, 1)
1\ 2 Dove Hawk
Dove
Hawk
(3, 3)
(4, 1)
(1, 4)
(0, 0)
Figure 2: Payoff matrices for Matching Pennies, Prisoner’s Dilemma, and
Hawk-Dove. Nash equilibria are set in bold font.
Prisoner’s Dilemma, two prisoners can either cooperate or defect with the police.
Finally, the Hawk-Dove game is similar, but the payoffs are different. The higher
the payoff the better it is for the respective player.
Definition 2 (Solution Concepts in Games) There are severalwell-known
solution concepts such as:
Nash Equilibrium (NE): A strategy profile such that no agent can unilaterally
deviate from her strategy and get a better payoff;
Pareto Optimality (PO): There is no other strategy profile that leads to a pay-
off profile which is at least as good for each agent, and strictly better for at
least one agent;
Weakly Undominated Strategies (UNDOM): These are strategies that are
not dominated by any other strategy, i.e., such that there is no strategy at least
as good for all the responses of the opponent, and strictly better for at least one
response.
We do not repeat the formal definitions here and refer to the literature [35]. We
point out, however, that some solution concepts yield sets of individual strategies
(UNDOM), while others produce rather sets of strategy profiles (NE, PO).
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In the examples fromFigure 2, there is noNash equilibrium for theMatch-
ing Pennies game, exactly one Nash equilibrium for the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(namely, the strategy profile 〈D,D〉), and two Nash equilibria for the Hawk-
Dove game (〈Hawk,Dove〉 and 〈Dove,Hawk〉).
In NF games, agents do their moves simultaneously: They do not see the
move of the opponent and therefore cannot act accordingly. On the other
hand, there are many games where the move of one player should depend
on the preceding move of the opponent, or even on the whole history. This
idea is captured in games of extensive form.
Definition 3 (Extensive Form (EF) Game) A (perfect information) exten-
sive form game Γ is a tuple of the form Γ = 〈P,A,H, ow, u〉, where:
• P is a finite set of players,
• A a finite set of actions (moves),
• H is a set of finite action sequences (game histories), such that (1) ∅ ∈ H, (2)
if h ∈ H, then every initial segment of h is also in H. We use the notation
A(h) = {m | h ◦m ∈ H} to denote themoves available at h, and Term =
{h | A(h) = ∅}, the set of terminal positions,
• ow : H → P defines which player “owns” history h, i.e., has the next move
given h,
• u : P × Term → U assigns agents’ utilities to every terminal position of the
game.
We will usually assume that the set of utilities U is finite.
Such games can be easily represented as trees of all possible plays.
Example 2 (Bargaining) Consider bargaining with discount [35, 37]. Two
players, 1 and 2, bargain about how to split goods worth initially w0 = 1 EUR.
After each round without agreement, the subjective worth of the goods reduces by
discount rates δ1 (for player a1) and δ2 (for player a2). So, after t rounds, the goods
are worth 〈δt1, δt2〉, respectively. Subsequently, a1 (if t is even) or a2 (if t is odd)makes
an offer to split the goods in proportions 〈x, 1 − x〉, and the other player accepts or
rejects it. If the offer is accepted, then a1 takes xδt1, and a2 gets (1− x)δt2; otherwise
the game continues. The (infinite) extensive form game is shown in Figure 3. Note
that the tree has infinite depth as well as an inifite branching factor.
In order to obtain a finite set of payoffs, it is enough to assume that the goods are
split with finite precision represented by a rounding function r : R → R. So, after
t rounds, the goods are in fact worth 〈r(δt1), r(δt2)〉, respectively, and if the offer is
accepted, then a1 takes r(xδt1), and a2 gets r((1− x)δt2).
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1
2
(1, 0)
1
(δ1, 0)
2
...
2
...
1
...
2
(0, 1)
1
(0, δ2)
2
...
2
...
1
...
...
...
...
...
...
(1,
0)1
(0,1)1
ac
c2
(1
,0
) 2
(0,1)2
ac
c2
(1
,0
) 2
(0,1)2
ac
c1
(1
,0
) 1
(0,1)1 a
cc
1
(1
,0
) 1
(0,1)1
Figure 3: The bargaining game.
A strategy for player i ∈ P in extensive game Γ is a function that assigns a
legal move to each history owned by i. Note that a strategy profile (i.e., a com-
bination of strategies, one per player) determines a unique path from the
game root (∅) to one of the terminal nodes (and hence also a single profile of
payoffs). In consequence, one can construct the corresponding normal from
game NF (Γ) by enumerating strategy profiles and filling the payoff matrix
with resulting payoffs.
Example 3 (Sharing Game) Consider the Sharing Game in Figure 4A. Its
corresponding normal form game is presented in Figure 4B. Firstly, player 1 can
suggest how to share, say, two 1 EUR coins. E.g. (2, 0) means that 1 gets two euro
and 2 gets nothing. Subsequently, player 2 can accept the offer or reject it; in the
latter case both players get nothing.
The game includes 3 strategies for player 1 (which can be denoted by the action
that they prescribe at the beginning of the game), and 8 strategies for player 2 (gen-
erated by the combination of actions prescribed for the second move), which gives
24 strategy profiles in total. However, not all of them seem plausible. Constraining
the possible plays to Nash equilibria only, we obtain 9 “rational” strategy profiles
(cf. Figure 4B), although it is still disputable if all of them really “make sense”.
A subgame of an extensive game Γ is defined by a subtree of the game tree
of Γ.
Definition 4 (Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPN)) This solution
concept is an extension of NE: A strategy is a SPN in Γ if it is a NE in Γ and, in ad-
dition, a NE in all subgames of Γ.
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(A)
1
2
(0, 0) (2, 0)
2
(0, 0) (1, 1)
2
(0, 0) (0, 2)
(2, 0
) (1,1)
(0, 2)
no
yes no
yes no
yes
(B)
1\ 2 nnn nny nyn nyy ynn yny yyn yyy
(2, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (2, 0) (2, 0) (2, 0) (2, 0)
(1, 1) (0, 0) (0, 0) (1, 1) (1, 1) (0, 0) (0, 0) (1, 1) (1, 1)
(0, 2) (0, 0) (0, 2) (0, 0) (0, 2) (0, 0) (0, 2) (0, 0) (0, 2)
Figure 4: The Sharing game: (A) Extensive form; (B) Normal form. Nash equi-
libria are set in bold font. A strategy abc (a, b, c ∈ {y, n}) of player 2 denotes
the strategy in which 2 plays a (resp. b, c) if player 1 has played (2, 0) (resp.
(1, 1), (0, 2)) where n refers to “no” and y to “yes”.
Example 4 (Sharing Game ctd.) Consider again the fromExample 3. While
the game has 9Nash equilibria, only two of them are subgame perfect (〈(2, 0), yyy〉
and 〈(1, 1), nyn〉).
Example 5 (Bargaining ctd.) Consider the bargaining game fromExample 7.
The game has an immense number of possible outcomes. Still worse, every strategy
profile
sx :
{
a1 always offers 〈x, 1− x〉, and agrees to 〈y, 1− y〉 for y ≥ x
a2 always offers 〈x, 1− x〉, and agrees to 〈y, 1− y〉 iff 1− y ≥ 1− x
is a Nash equilibrium (NE): an agreement is reached in the first round. Thus,
every split 〈x, 1 − x〉 can be achieved through a Nash equilibrium; it seems that a
stronger solution concept is needed. Indeed, the game has a unique subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium. Because of the finite precision, there is a minimal round T
with r(δT+1i ) = 0 for i = 1 or i = 2. For simplicity, assume that i = 2 and agent
a1 is the offerer in T (i.e., T is even). Then, the only subgame perfect NE is given by
the strategy profile sκ with κ = (1 − δ2) 1−(δ1δ2)
T
2
1−δ1δ2 + (δ1δ2)
T
2 . The goods are split
〈κ, 1− κ〉; the agreement is reached in the first round.1
1For the standard version of bargaining with discount (with the continuous set of payoffs
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2.2 ATL
Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) [2, 3] enables reasoning about temporal
properties and strategic abilities of agents. Formally, the language of ATL is
given as follows.
Definition 5 (LATL) LetAgt = {a1, . . . , ak} be a nonempty finite set of all agents,
and Π be a set of propositions (with typical element p). We use the symbol a to de-
note a typical agent, and A to denote a typical group of agents from Agt. The logic
LATL(Agt,Π) is defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉 hϕ | 〈〈A〉〉2ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕUϕ.
Informally, 〈〈A〉〉ϕ says that agents A have a collective strategy to enforce
ϕ. ATL formulae include the usual temporal operators: h(in the next state),
2 (always from now on) and U (strict until). Additionally, 3 (now or sometime
in the future) can be defined as3ϕ ≡ >Uϕ. Like inCTL [13], every occurrence
of a temporal operator is immediately preceded by exactly one cooperation
modality (this variant of the language is sometimes called “vanilla” ATL).
The broader language of ATL∗, where no such restriction is imposed, is not
discussed in this article. It should be noted that the CTL path quantifiers
A,E can be expressed inATLwith 〈〈∅〉〉, 〈〈Agt〉〉 respectively. The semantics of
ATL is defined over concurrent game structures.
Definition 6 (CGS) A concurrent game structure (CGS) is a tuple: M =
〈Agt,Q ,Π, pi, Act, d, o〉, consisting of: a set Agt = {a1, . . . , ak} of agents; a
set Q of states; a set Π of atomic propositions; a valuation of propositions
pi : Q → P(Π); a set Act of actions. Function d : Agt × Q → P(Act) indicates
the actions available to agent a ∈ Agt in state q ∈ Q . We will often write da(q)
instead of d(a, q), and use d(q) to denote the set d1(q)× · · · × dk(q) of action pro-
files available in state q. Finally, o is a transition functionwhichmaps each state
q ∈ Q and action profile−→α = 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 ∈ d(q) to another state q′ = o(q,−→α ).
Remark 1 In the literature on ATL, the same symbols for agents (and groups of
agents) are used in the semantics and in the object language; we follow this tradi-
tion here.
A computation or path λ = q0q1 · · · ∈ Qω is an infinite sequence of states
such that there is a transition between each qi, qi+1.We define λ[i] = qi to
denote the i-th state of λ. ΛM denotes all paths in M . The set of all paths
starting in q is given by ΛM (q).
Definition 7 (Strategy, outcome) A (memoryless) strategy of agent a is a
function sa : Q → Act such that sa(q) ∈ da(q). We denote the set of such functions
[0, 1]), cf. [35, 37]. Restricting the payoffs to a finite set requires to alter the solution slightly [40,
33], see also Appendix A.
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by Σa. A collective strategy sA for team A ⊆ Agt specifies an individual strategy
for each agent a ∈ A; the set of A’s collective strategies is given by ΣA =
∏
a∈A Σa.
The set of all strategy profiles is given by Σ = ΣAgt.
The outcome of strategy sA in state q is defined as the set of all paths that may
result from executing sA from state q on: out(q, sA) = {λ ∈ ΛM (q) | ∀i ∈ N0 ∃−→α =
〈α1, . . . , αk〉 ∈ d(λ[i]) ∀a ∈ A (αa = saA(λ[i]) ∧ o(λ[i],−→α ) = λ[i + 1])}, where saA
denotes agent a’s part of the collective strategy sA.
The semantics ofATL can be given by the following clauses:
M, q |= p iff p ∈ pi(q)
M, q |= ¬ϕ iffM, q 6|= ϕ
M, q |= ϕ ∧ ψ iffM, q |= ϕ andM, q |= ψ
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 hϕ iff there is sA ∈ ΣA such thatM,λ[1] |= ϕ for allλ ∈ out(q, sA)
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉2ϕ iff there is sA ∈ ΣA such thatM,λ[i] |= ϕ for all λ ∈ out(q, sA)
and i ∈ N0
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕUψ iff there is sA ∈ ΣA such that, for all λ ∈ out(q, sA), there is
i ∈ N0 withM,λ[i] |= ψ, andM,λ[j] |= ϕ for all 0 ≤ j < i.
Remark 2 Wesomewhat deviate from the original semantics ofATL [2, 3], where
strategies assign agents’ choices to sequences of states (which suggests that agents
can recall the whole history of each game). While the choice between the two types
of strategies affects the semantics of most ATL extensions, both yield equivalent
semantics for pureATL [38].
3 Relating Games andATL-Like Logics
In this section we present some important ideas that form the starting point
for later sections. (1) We discuss informally how the notion of strategic abil-
ity in ATL can be refined so that it takes into account only “sensible” be-
haviour of agents. (2) We look back on the logic of GLP [51] which imple-
ments the idea formally, albeit in a very limitedway. (3)We summarize a cor-
respondence between extensive games and the models ofATL. (4) We recall
an extension ofATL, calledATLI (“ATLwith Intentions”), which will later
serve as an intermediate logical framework and as a motivation for our logic
ATLP.We also demonstrate how several game-theoretical solution concepts
can be expressed in ATLI. (5) Finally we present our idea of qualitative so-
lution concepts, where ATL path formulae are used to define the winning
conditions.
We illustrate the ideaswith two examples from theprevious section:Match-
ing Pennies and Bargaining with Discounts.
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(A)
q0
start
q1 money1
money2
q2 q3money2
h
ea
d,
h
ea
d he
a
d
,
ta
il
ta
il,
h
e
a
d
tail, tail
n
o
p
,
n
o
pn
op
, n
op
n
op, n
op
(B)
1\2 sh st
sh 1, 1 0, 0
st 0, 0 0, 1
Figure 5: Asymmetricmatching pennies: (A)Concurrent game structureM1. In
q0 the agents can choose to show head or tail. Both agents can only execute
actionnop (no operation) in states q1, q2, q3. (B)The correspondingNF game.
We use sh (resp. st ) to denote the strategy in which the player always shows
head (resp. tail) in q0 and nop in q1, q2, and q3.
3.1 ATL andRational Play
Example 6 (Asymmetricmatching pennies) Consider a variant of thematch-
ing pennies game, presented in Figure 5A. Formally, the model is given as follows:
M1 = 〈{1, 2}, {q0, q1, q2, q3}, {start,money1,money2}, pi, {head , tail ,nop}, d, o〉
where pi is given as in the picture (pi(q0) = {start} etc.), d(a, q0) = {head , tail}
for a = 1, 2, and d(a, q) = {nop} for a = 1, 2 and q = q1, q2, q3. The transition
function o can also be read off from the picture. We use nop (no operation) as a
“default” action in states q1, q2, and q3 that brings the system back to the initial
state. The intuition is that the game is played ad infinitum. Alternatively, one
might add loops to states q1, q2 and q3 to model a game that is played only once.
If both players show heads in q0, both win a prize in the next step; if they both
show tails, only player 2wins. If they show different sides, nobody wins. Note that,
e.g.,M1, q0 |= 〈〈2〉〉2¬money1, because agent 2 can play tail all the time, preventing
1 fromwinning the prize. On the other hand,M1, q0 |= ¬〈〈2〉〉3money2: Agent 2 has
no strategy to guarantee that she will win.
The concurrent game structure in Figure 5A determines the set of available strat-
egy profiles. However, it does not say anything about players’ preferences. Suppose
now that the players are only interested in getting some money sometime in the fu-
ture (but it does not matter when and/or how much). The corresponding normal
form game under this assumption is depicted in Figure 5B.
Such an analysis of the game is of course correct, yet it appears to be quite
coarse. It seems natural to assume that players prefer winning money over
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losing it. If we additionally assume that the players are rational thinkers, it
seems plausible that player 1 should always play head, as it keeps the possi-
bility of getting money open (while playing tail guarantees loss). Under this
assumption, player 2 has complete control over the outcome of the game:
She can play head too, granting herself and the other agent with the prize,
or respond with tail, in which case both players lose. Note that this kind
of analysis corresponds to the game-theoretical notion of weakly dominant
strategy: For agent 1, playing head is dominant in the corresponding normal
form game in Figure 5B, while both strategies of player 2 are undominated,
so they can be in principle considered for playing.
It is still possible to refine our analysis of the game. Note that 2, knowing
that 1 ought to play head and preferring to win money too, should decide
to play head herself. This kind of reasoning corresponds to the notion of
iterated undominated strategies. If we assume that both players do reason this
way, then 〈sh, sh〉 is the only rational strategy profile, and the game should
end with both agents winning the prize.
3.2 Game Logicwith Preferences
Game Logic with Preferences [51] is, to our knowledge, the only logic de-
signed to address the outcome of rational play in games with perfect infor-
mation. Here, we summarize the idea very briefly.
The central idea of GLP is facilitated by the preference operator [a : ϕ]. In-
terpretation of [a : ϕ]ψ in modelM proceeds as follows: if the truth of ϕ can
be enforced by a, then we remove from the model all the actions of a that
do not lead to enforcing it, and evaluate ψ in the resulting model. Thus, the
evaluation ofGLP formulae is underpinned by the assumption that rational
agents satisfy their preferences whenever they can. The requirement applies to
all the subtrees of the game tree, and it is called “subgame perfectness” by
the authors.
The scope ofGLP, however, is limited in several respects. Firstly, themod-
els of GLP are restricted to finite game trees. Secondly, agents’ preferences
must be specified with propositional (non-modal) formulae, and they are
evaluated only at the terminal states of the game. The temporal part of the
language is limited, too. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the seman-
tics ofGLP is based on a very specific notion of rationality (see above). One
can easily imagine variants of the semantics, in which other rationality cri-
teria are used (NE, PO, UNDOM) to eliminate “irrational” strategies. Indeed,
a preliminary version of GLP was based on the notion of Nash equilibrium
rather than “subgame perfectness” [50]. In this article, we want to allow as
much flexibility as possible with respect to the choice of a suitable solution
concept.
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3.3 Models of ATL vs. Extensive Games
In this section, we recall the correspondence between extensive form games
and the semantical models ofATL, proposed in [30] and inspired by [5, 45].
We only consider game trees in which the set of payoffs is finite. Let U de-
note the set of all possible utility values in a game; U will be finite and fixed
for any given game. For each value v ∈ U and agent a ∈ Agt, we introduce
a proposition pva into our set Π, and fix pva ∈ pi(q) iff a gets payoff of at least v
in q.2 States in the model represent finite histories in the game. In particu-
lar, we us ∅ to denote the root of the game. The correspondence between an
extensive game Γ and a CGSM can be captured as follows.
Definition 8 (FromExtensive Games to CGS) ACGSM = {Agt,Q ,Π, pi,
Act, d, o} corresponds to an extensive game Γ = 〈P,A,H, ow, u〉 if, and only if,
the following holds:
• Agt = P,
• Q = H,
• Π and pi include propositions pva to emulate utilities for terminal states in the
way described above,
• Act = A ∪ {nop},
• da(q) = A(q) if a = ow(q) and da(q) = {nop} otherwise,
• o(q, nop, . . . ,m, . . . , nop) = q ·m, and
• o(q, nop, nop, . . . , nop) = q for q ∈ Term.
We useM(Γ) to refer to theCGSwhich corresponds to Γ.
Example 7 (Bargaining in a CGS) We consider the bargaining game from
Example 2, but this time as a model of ATL. The CGS corresponding to the game
shown in Figure 6. Nodes represent various states of the negotiation process, and
arcs show how agents’ moves change the state of the game. A node label refers to
the history of the game for better readability. For instance,
 0, 11, 0
acc
 has the meaning
that in the first round 1 offered 〈0, 1〉 which was rejected by 2. In the next round 2’s
offer 〈1, 0〉 has been accepted by 1 and the game has ended.
Note that, for every extensive game Γ, there is a corresponding CGS, but
the reverse is not true: Concurrent game structures can include cycles and
simultaneous moves of players, which are absent in game trees. Note also
that, for those CGS’s that correspond to some EF game, we get an implicit
correspondence to a normal form game. We will extend this notion of cor-
respondence to all CGS’s in Section 3.5.
2 Note that a state labeled by pva is also labeled by pv
′
a for all v′ ∈ U where v′ < v.
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q0
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Figure 6: CGSM2 for the bargaining game
3.4 ATLI and Solution Concepts
The correspondence between extensive games and (some) concurrent game
structures gives us a way of performing game-theoretical analysis on the lat-
ter. In particular, game-theoretical solution concepts become meaningful
for these CGS’s. This section illustrates how several important notions of ra-
tionality from game theory, e.g. Nash equilibria (NE), subgame perfect NE,
Pareto optimality etc. can be characterized in a suitable logical language. We
use the analysis from [30] where an extension ofATL, calledATLI, was em-
ployed for this purpose. We will later show how these characterizations can
be “plugged” into our new logicATLP so that one can reason about the out-
come of rational play in a precisely defined sense.
We also point out after [30] that these characterizations give rise to gener-
alized versions of solution concepts which can be applied to all CGS’s, and
not only to those that correspond to some extensive form game.
Alternating-time temporal logic with intentions (ATLI) extendsATLwith for-
mulae (straσa)ϕ with the intuitive reading: Suppose that player a intends to
play according to strategy σa, then ϕ holds. Thus, it allows to refer to agents’
strategies explicitly via terms σa. LetStr =
⋃
a∈AgtStra be a finite set of strate-
gic terms. Stra are used to denote individual strategies of agent a ∈ Agt; we
assume that allStra are disjoint.
Definition 9 (LATLI) Let p ∈ Π, a ∈ Agt, A ⊆ Agt, and σa ∈ Stra. The
language LATLI(Agt,Π,Str) is defined as:
θ ::= p | ¬θ | θ ∧ θ | 〈〈A〉〉 hθ | 〈〈A〉〉2θ | 〈〈A〉〉θUθ | (straσa)θ.
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ATLIModelsM = 〈Agt,Q ,Π, pi, Act, d, o, I,Str, [·]〉 extend concurrent game
structures with intention relations I ⊆ Q×Agt×Act (where qIaαmeans that a
possibly intends to do action α when in q). Moreover, strategic terms are in-
terpreted as strategies according to function [·] : Str → ⋃a∈Agt Σa such that
[σa] ∈ Σa for σa ∈ Stra (remember that Σa denotes the set of a’s strategies).
The set of paths consistent with all agents’ intentions is defined as
ΛI = {λ ∈ ΛM | ∀i ∃α ∈ d(λ[i]) (o(λ[i], α) = λ[i+ 1] ∧ ∀a ∈ Agt λ[i]Iaαa)}
We impose on I the natural requirement that qIaα implies that α ∈ da(q) for
a ∈ Agt; that is, agents only intend to do actions if they are actually able to
perform them.
We say that strategy sA is consistent with A’s intentions if qIasaA(q) for all
q ∈ Q , a ∈ A. The intention-consistent outcome set is defined as: outI(q, sA) =
out(q, sA) ∩ ΛI . The semantics of strategic operators in ATLI extends and
replaces the semantic rules ofATL as follows:
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 hθ iff there is a collective strategy sA consistent with A’s in-
tentions, such that for every λ ∈ outI(q, sA), we have thatM,λ[1] |= θ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉2θ andM, q |= 〈〈A〉〉θUθ′: analogous;
M, q |= (straσ)θ iff revise(M,a, [σ]), q |= θ.
The function revise(M,a, sa) updates modelM by setting a’s intention rela-
tion to
I ′a = {〈q, sa(q)〉 | q ∈ Q},
so that sa and Ia represent the same mapping in the resulting model. Note
that a pure CGSM can be seen as a CGSwith the full intention relation
I0 = {〈q, a, α〉 | q ∈ Q , a ∈ Agt, α ∈ da(q)}.
Additionally, forA = {ai1 , . . . , air} andσA = 〈σai1 , . . . , σair 〉, wedefine: (strAσA)ϕ ≡
(strai1σai1 ) . . . (strairσair )ϕ. Furthermore, for B = {b1, . . . , bl} ⊆ A we use
σA[B] to refer toB’s substrategy, i.e. to 〈σb1 , . . . , σbl〉
Example 8 (Asymmetricmatching pennies ctd.) Coming back to ourmatch-
ing pennies example fromFigure 5, we have for instance thatM1, q0 |= (str1σ)〈〈2〉〉3money2
if the denotation of σ is set to sh .
With temporal logic, it is natural to define outcomes of strategies via prop-
erties of resulting paths rather than single states. The notion of temporal T -
Nash equilibrium, parameterizedwith aunary operatorT = h,2,3, _Uψ,ψU_,
was proposed in [30]. Let σ = 〈σ1, . . . , σk〉 be a profile of strategic terms, and
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let T stand for any of the following operators: h,2,3, _Uψ,ψU_ and let a be
an agent. Then we consider the following LATLI formulae:
BRTa (σ) ≡ (strAgt\{a}σ[Agt \ {a}])
∧
v∈U
(
(〈〈a〉〉Tpva)→ ((straσ[a])〈〈∅〉〉Tpva)
)
NET (σ) ≡
∧
a∈Agt
BRTa (σ)
SPNT (σ) ≡ 〈〈∅〉〉2NET (σ).
BRTa (σ) refers toσ[a]being aT -best strategy for a againstσ[Agt\{a}];NET (σ)
expresses that strategy profile σ is a T-Nash equilibrium; finally, SPNT (σ)
defines σ as subgame perfect T-NE. Thus, we have a family of equilibria: h-
Nash equilibrium,2-Nash equilibrium etc., each corresponding to a different
temporal pattern of utilities. For example, we may assume that agent a gets v if
a utility of at least v is guaranteed for every timemoment (2pva), is eventually
achieved (3pva), and so on.
The correspondence between solution concepts and their temporal coun-
terparts for extensive games is captured by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Let Γ be an extensive game. Then the following holds:
1. M(Γ), ∅ |= NE3(σ) iff [σ]M(Γ) is a NE in Γ [30].3
2. M(Γ), ∅ |= SPN3(σ) iff [σ]M(Γ) is a SPN in Γ.
Proof sketch
1. Since M(Γ) corresponds to an EF game, the “payoff” propositions pva
can only become true at the end of each path inM(Γ). Thus,BR3a (σ) in
M(Γ), ∅ holds iff, whenever a can achieve the payoff of at least v against
σ[Agt\{a}] (by any strategy), it can also achieve that by using σ[a]. That
is, a cannot obtain a better payoff by unilaterally changing her strategy.
2. M(Γ), ∅ |= SPN3(σ) iffM(Γ), q |= NE3(σ) for every q reachable from
the root ∅ (*). However, Γ is a tree, so every node is reachable from ∅ in
M(Γ). So, by the first part, (*) iff σ denotes a Nash equilibrium in every
subtree of Γ. 
We can use the above ATLI formulae to express game-theoretical proper-
ties of strategies in a straightforward way.
Example 9 (Bargaining ctd.) We extend theCGS in Figure 6 to aCGSwith
intentions; then, we haveM2, q0 |= NE3(σ), with σ interpreted inM2 as sx (for
any x ∈ [0, 1]). Still,M2, q0 |= SPN3(σ) if, and only if, [σ]M2 = sκ.
3 The empty history ∅ denotes the root of the game tree.
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Wealsopropose a tentativeATLI characterizationofPareto optimality (based
on the characterization from [45] for normal form games):
POT (σ) ≡
∧
v1
· · ·
∧
vk
(
(〈〈Agt〉〉T
∧
i
pvii ) → (strAgtσ)
(
(〈〈∅〉〉T
∧
i
pvii ) ∨ (
∨
i
∨
v′ s.t.
v′ > vi
〈〈∅〉〉Tpv′i )
))
.
That is, the strategy profile denoted by σ is Pareto optimal iff, for every
achievable pattern of payoff profiles, either it can be achieved by σ, or σ ob-
tains a strictly better payoff pattern for at least one player. Note that the
above formula has exponential length with respect to the number of pay-
offs in U . Moreover, it is not obvious that this characterization is the right
one, as it refers in fact to the evolution of payoff profiles (i.e., combinations of
payoffs achieved by agents at the same time), and not temporal patterns of
payoff evolution for each agent separately. So, for example,PO3(σ)mayhold
even if there is a strategy profile σ′ that makes each agent achieve eventually
a better payoff, as long as not all of them will achieve these better payoffs at
the samemoment. Still, the following holds.
Proposition 4 Let Γ be an extensive game. Then:
M(Γ), ∅ |= PO3(σ) iff [σ]M(Γ) is Pareto optimal in Γ.
Proof LetM(Γ), ∅ |= PO3(σ). Then, for every payoff profile 〈v1, . . . , vk〉 reach-
able in Γ, we have that either [σ] obtains at least as good a profile,4 or it ob-
tains an incomparable payoff profile. Thus, [σ] is Pareto optimal. The proof
for the other direction is analogous. 
Example 10 (Asymmetricmatching pennies ctd.) LetM ′1 be ourmatch-
ing pennies modelM1 with additional propositions p1i ≡ moneyi (so, we assign to
moneyi a utility of 1 for i). Then, we have M ′1, q0 |= PO3(σ) iff σ denotes the
strategy profile 〈sh , sh〉.
3.5 General Solution Concepts
In this part we present an abstract formulation of our notion of general so-
lution concept. We will elaborate on it later in Section 5.3, using our logic
ATLP.
We have seen in Section 3.3 that some (but not all!) concurrent game
structures can be seen as extensive form games, which in turn defines their
correspondence to NF games. These CGS’s must be turn-based (i.e., play-
ers play by taking turns) and have a tree-like structure; moreover, they must
4We recall that
∧
i p
vi
i means that each player i gets at least vi.
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include special propositions that emulate payoffs and can be used to define
agents’ preferences. Now,wewant to extend the correspondence to arbitrary
CGS’s. Our idea is to determine the outcome of a game by the truth of certain path
formulae (e.g., in the case of binary payoffs, we can see the formulae as win-
ning conditions). So, we give up the idea of assigning payoffs to leaves in a tree.
Instead, we see a concurrent game structure as a game, paths in the structure
as plays in the game, and satisfaction of some pre-specified formulae as the
mechanism that defines agents’ outcome for a given play.
Which formulae can be used in this respect?
Definition 10 (ATL Path Formulae) ByATLpath formulae, we denote ar-
bitraryATL formulae that are preceded by a temporal operator h,2,U .
Given a CGSM and a path λ inM , satisfaction of path formulae is defined as
follows:
M,λ |= hϕ iffM,λ[1] |= ϕ
M,λ |= 2ϕ iffM,λ[i] |= ϕ for all i ∈ N0
M,λ |= ϕUψ iff there is i ∈ N0withM,λ[i] |= ψ, andM,λ[j] |= ϕ for all 0 ≤ j < i.
We propose that player i’s preferences can be specified by a finite list of
path formulae ηi = 〈η1i , . . . , ηnii 〉 (where ni ∈ N) with the underlying assump-
tion that agent i prefers η1i most, η
2
i comes second best etc., and the worst
outcome occurs when no η1i , . . . , η
ni
i holds for the actual play. Thus, ηi im-
poses a total order on paths in a CGS.
For k players, we need a k-vector of such preference lists −→η = 〈η1, . . . , ηk〉.
Then, every concurrent game structure gives rise to the strategic game de-
fined as below.
Definition 11 (FromCGS ToNFGame) LetM be a CGS, q ∈ QM a state,
and−→η = 〈η1, . . . , ηk〉 a vector of lists ofATL path formulae, where k = |Agt|.
Then we define S(M,−→η , q), theNF game associated withM ,−→η , and q, as the
strategic game 〈Agt,A1, . . . ,Ak, µ〉, where the setAi of i’s strategies is given by Σi
for each i ∈ Agt, and the payoff function is defined as follows:
µi(a1, . . . , ak) =

ni − j + 1 if ηji is the first formula from ηi such thatM,λ |= ηji
for all λ ∈ out(q, 〈a1, . . . , ak〉),
0 no ηji is satisfied
where ηi = 〈η1i , . . . , ηnii 〉, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni and we write µi for µ(i).
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Below, we present the generalized version of temporal Nash equilibrium
and temporal subgame perfect NE.
BR
−→η
a (σ) ≡ (strAgt\{a}σ[Agt \ {a}])
∧
j
(
(〈〈a〉〉ηja)→ ((straσ[a])
∨
r≤j
〈〈∅〉〉ηra)
)
NE
−→η (σ) ≡
∧
a∈Agt
BR
−→η
a (σ)
SPN
−→η (σ) ≡ 〈〈∅〉〉2NE−→η (σ).
The case with a single “winning condition” per agent is particularly inter-
esting. Clearly, it gives rise to a normal form game with binary payoffs (cf.,
for instance, our informal discussion of the “matching pennies” variant in
Example 6). We will stick to such binary games throughout the rest of the
paper (especially in Section 5.3 where general solution concepts are studied
in more detail), but one can easily imagine how the binary case extends to
the case withmultiple levels of preference.
4 The Logic ATLP
Agents have limited ability to predict the future. However, some lines of ac-
tion seem often more sensible or realistic than others. If a rationality cri-
terion is available, we obtain means to focus on a proper subset of possible
plays. In game theoretic terms,we solve the game, i.e., we determine themost
plausible plays, and compute their outcome. In game theory, the outcome
consists of the payoffs (or utilities) assigned to players at the end of the game.
In temporal logics, the outcome of a play can be seen in terms of temporal
patterns that can occur — which allows for much subtler descriptions. In
Section 3.4 we explained how rationality can be characterized with formu-
lae of modal logic (ATLI in this case). Now we show how the outcome of
rational play can be described with a similar (but richer) logic, and that both
aspects can be seamlessly combined.
Our logicATLP (“ATLwith Plausibility”) comes in several steps, based on
different underlying languages:
LbaseATLP: Sets of plausible/rational strategy profiles can be only referred to via
atomic plausibility terms (constants)whose interpretation is “hardwired”
in the model. A typical LbaseATLP statement is (set-pl ω)Plϕ: Suppose that
the set of rational strategy profiles is defined by ω – then, it is plausible to ex-
pect that ϕ holds. For instance, one can reason about what should hap-
pen if only Nash equilibria were played, or about the abilities of players
who play only Pareto optimal profiles, had terms for NE and PO been
included in themodel.
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L0ATLP: Amild extension of LbaseATLP. We allow some combinations of the con-
stants of LbaseATLP to formmore complex terms.
LATLPATLI : An intermediate language,where rational strategyprofiles are char-
acterized byATLI formulae.
LkATLP: Here we have nestings of plausibility updates up to level k. It turns
out that LATLPATLI is already embedded in L1ATLP.
LATLP: Unbounded nestings of formulae are allowed.
The language LbaseATLP is presented in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. Then, in Sec-
tion 4.3, we consider an intermediate step, namely plausibility terms writ-
ten in ATLI. They serve as a motivation to extend LbaseATLP to L1ATLP, and, more
generally, to a hierarchy LATLP = limk→∞ LkATLP which we investigate in Sec-
tion 4.4.
4.1 The Language LbaseATLP
Weextend the language ofATLwithoperatorsPlA , (set-pl ω), and (refn-pl ω).
The first assumes plausible behaviour of agents inA; the latter are used to fix
the actual meaning of plausibility by plausibility terms ω. As yet, the terms
are simply constants with no internal structure. Their meaning will be given
later by a denotation function linking plausibility terms to sets of strategy
profiles.
Definition 12 (LbaseATLP) The base languageLbaseATLP(Agt,Π,Ω) is defined over nonempty
sets: Π of propositions ,Agt of agents, andΩ of plausibility terms. We use p, a, ω to
refer to typical elements ofΠ,Agt,Ω respectively, andA to refer to a group of agents.
LATLP(Agt,Π,Ω) consists of all formulae defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉 hϕ | 〈〈A〉〉2ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕUϕ |
PlA ϕ | (set-pl ω)ϕ | (refn-pl ω)ϕ,
Additionally, we define 3ϕ as >Uϕ, Pl as PlAgt , and Ph as Pl∅ . We will often
use LbaseATLP to refer to the language if the sets are clear from the context.
PlA assumes that agents in A play rationally; this means that the agents
can only use strategy profiles that are plausible in the given model. In par-
ticular, Pl (≡ PlAgt ) imposes rational behaviour on all agents in the system.
Similarly, Ph disregards plausibility assumptions, and refers to all physically
available scenarios. The model update operator (set-pl ω) allows to define
(or redefine) the set of plausible strategy profiles (referred to by Υ in the
model) to the ones described by plausibility term ω (in this sense, it imple-
ments revision of plausibility). Operator (refn-pl σ) enables refining the set
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of plausible strategy profiles, i.e. selecting a subset of the previously plausible
profiles.
WithATLP, we can for example say thatPl 〈〈∅〉〉2(closed∧Ph 〈〈guard〉〉 h¬closed):
It is plausible to expect that the emergency door will always remain closed, but the
guard retains the physical ability to open it; or (set-pl ωNE)Pl 〈〈2〉〉3money2: Sup-
pose that only playing Nash equilibria is rational; then, agent a can plausibly reach
a state where she gets some money.
We note that, in contrast to [16, 43, 9], the concept of plausibility pre-
sented in this article is objective, i.e. it does not vary from agent to agent.
This is very much in the spirit of game theory, where rationality criteria are
used in an analogous way. Moreover, it is global, because plausibility sets do
not depend on the state of the system. Note, however, that the denotation
of plausibility terms depends on the actual state.
4.2 Semantics of LbaseATLP
To define the semantics of ATLP, we extend CGS’s to concurrent game struc-
tures with plausibility. Apart from an actual set of plausible strategiesΥ, a con-
current game structure with plausibility (CGSP) must specify the denotation of
plausibility terms ω ∈ Ω. It is defined via a plausibility mapping
[[·]] : Q → (Ω→ P(Σ))
Instead of [[q]](ω)we will often write [[ω]]q to turn the focus to the plausibility
terms. Each term is mapped to a set of strategy profiles. Note also, that the
denotation of a term depends on the state. In a way, the current state of the
system defines the “initial position in the game”, and this heavily influences
the set of rational strategy profiles for most rationality criteria. For example,
a strategy profile can be a Nash equilibrium (NE) in q0, and yet it may not be
a NE in some of its successors.
We will propose a more concrete (and more practical) implementation of
plausibility terms in Section 4.4.
Definition 13 (CGSP) A concurrent game structurewithplausibility (CGSP)
is given by a tuple
M = 〈Agt,Q ,Π, pi, Act, d, o,Υ,Ω, [[·]]〉
where 〈Agt,Q ,Π, pi, Act, d, o〉 is aCGS,Υ ⊆ Σ is a set of plausible strategy profiles
(called plausibility set); Ω is a set of of plausibility terms, and [[·]] is a plausibility
mapping overQ and Ω.
By CGSP (Agt,Π,Ω) we denote the set of all CGSP’s over Agt, Π and Ω. Fur-
thermore, for a given CGSPM we useXM to refer to elementX ofM , e.g., QM to
refer to the setQ of states ofM .
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Definition 14 (Compatiblemodel) Given a formula ϕ ∈ LATLP(Agt,Π,Ω)
a CGSPM is called compatible with ϕ if, and only if,M ∈ CGSP (Agt,Π,Ω).
That is, the model interprets all symbols occurring in ϕ. A modelM is called com-
patible with a set L of ATLP formulae if, and only if,M is compatible with each
formula in L.
We will assume by default that, given a formula or a set of formulae, the model
we consider is compatible with it.
The formula Pl 〈〈A〉〉γ implies that A can only play plausible strategies.
Thus,A’s part of the strategy profiles inΥ is of particular interest whichmo-
tivates the following definition.
Definition 15 (Substrategy) Let A,B ⊆ Agt be groups of agents such that
A ⊆ B and let sB ∈ ΣB be a collective strategy for agentsB. We use sB |A to denote
A’s substrategy tA contained in sB , i.e., strategy tA ∈ ΣA such that taA = saB for
every a ∈ A.5 For a singleton coalition {a}, we also write sB |a instead of sB |{a}.
For a given set PB ⊆ ΣB of collective strategies of agentsB, PB |A denotes the set
ofA’s substrategies in PB, i.e.:
PB |A = {sA ∈ ΣA | ∃s′B ∈ PB (s′B |A = sA)}.
Often, we impose restrictions only on a subset B ⊆ Agt of agents, with-
out assuming rational play of all agents. This can be desirable due to several
reasons. It might, for example, be the case that only information about the
proponents’ play is available; hence, assuming plausible behavior of the op-
ponents is neither sensible nor justified. Or, even simpler, a group of (simple
minded) agents might be known to not behave rationally.
Consider formula PlB 〈〈A〉〉γ: The team A looks for a strategy that brings
about γ, but the members of the team who are also in B can only choose
plausible strategies. The same applies toA’s opponents that are contained in
B. Strategies which comply with B’s part of some plausible strategy profile
are calledB-plausible.
Definition 16 (B-plausibility of strategies) Let A,B ⊆ Agt and sA ∈
ΣA. We say that sA is B-plausible in M if, and only if, B’s substrategy in sA
is part of some plausible strategy profile inM , i.e., if sA|A∩B ∈ ΥM |A∩B.
By ΥM (B) we denote the set of all B-plausible strategy profiles inM . That is,
ΥM (B) = {s ∈ Σ | s|B ∈ ΥM |B}. Note that sA isB-plausible iff sA ∈ ΥM (B)|A.
We observe that sA is triviallyB-plausible wheneverA andB are disjoint.
As mentioned above, if some opponents belong to the set of agents who
are assumed to play plausibly then they must also comply with the actual
plausibility specifications when choosing their actions; this is taken into ac-
count by the following notion of plausible outcome.
5 We recall that saB (resp. t
a
A) denotes a’s part of sB (resp. tA).
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Definition 17 (B-plausible outcome) TheB-plausible outcome, outM (q, sA, B),
with respect to strategy sA and state q is defined as the set of paths which can occur
when onlyB-plausible strategy profiles can be played and agents inA follow sA:
outM (q, sA, B) = {λ ∈ ΛM (q) | there exists aB-plausible t ∈ Σ such that
t|A = sA and outM (q, t) = {λ}}.
Note that the outcome outM (q, sA, B) is emptywhenever the (A∩B)’s part
of sA is not part of any plausible strategy profile inΥM . For example, assume
that all agents in B play only parts of Nash equilibria. Then for a given sA
there are two possibilities for the B-consistent outcome. Either it is empty
because (A ∩ B)’s part of sA does not belong to any Nash equilibrium, or it
consists of all paths which can occur when (1)A stick to sA, (2)B (including
A ∩ B) play according to some Nash equilibrium, and (3) the other agents
behave arbitrarily.
The truth ofATLP formulae is given with respect to a model, a state, and
a set B of agents. The intuitive reading ofM, q |=B ϕ is: “ϕ is true in model
M and state q if it is assumed that players in B play rationally”, i.e., by us-
ing only plausible combinations of strategies. No constraints are imposed
on the behaviour of agents outside B, but the plausibility operator PlA can
be used to change the set of agents (viz A) whose play is restricted. The up-
date/refinement modalities (set-pl ω)/(refn-pl ω) are used to change the
plausibility setΥM in the model.
Definition 18 (Semantics of LbaseATLP) LetM ∈ CGSP (Agt,Π,Ω) andA,B ⊆
Agt. The semantics ofATLP formulae is given as follows:
M, q |=B p iff p ∈ pi(q) and p ∈ Π
M, q |=B ¬ϕ iffM, q 6|=B ϕ
M, q |=B ϕ ∧ ψ iffM, q |=B ϕ andM, q |=B ψ
M, q |=B 〈〈A〉〉 hϕ iff there is a B-plausible sA s.t. M,λ[1] |=B ϕ for all λ ∈
outM (q, sA, B)
M, q |=B 〈〈A〉〉2ϕ iff there is a B-plausible sA s.t. M,λ[i] |=B ϕ for all λ ∈
outM (q, sA, B) and all i ∈ N0
M, q |=B 〈〈A〉〉ϕUψ iff there is aB-plausible sA such that, for allλ ∈ outM (q, sA, B),
there is i ∈ N0 withM,λ[i] |=B ψ, andM,λ[j] |=B ϕ for all 0 ≤ j < i
M, q |=B PlA ϕ iffM, q |=A ϕ
M, q |=B (set-pl ω)ϕ iffM ′, q |=B ϕ where the new modelM ′ is equal toM but
the new setΥM ′ of plausible strategy profiles ofM
′ is set to [[ω]]qM .
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M, q |=B (refn-pl ω)ϕ iff M ′, q |=B ϕ where M ′ is equal to M but ΥM ′ set to
ΥM ∩ [[ω]]qM .
The “absolute” satisfaction relation |= is given by |=∅.
Definition 19 (Validity) Letϕ ∈ LATLP(Agt,Π,Ω) andM ⊆ CGSP (Agt,Π,Ω).
Formula ϕ is valid with respect toM if, and only if,M, q |= ϕ for everyM ∈ M
and state q ∈ QM .
Note that an ordinary concurrent game structure (without plausibility)
can be interpreted as a CGSP with all strategy profiles assumed plausible,
i.e., withΥ = Σ, and empty set of plausibility terms Ω.
Let us clarify the semantics behindPlB〈〈A〉〉γ oncemore. The proponents
(A) look for a strategy that enforces γ; some of them (A ∩ B) are assumed to
play a part of a plausible strategy profile while the others (A \ B) can choose
an arbitrary collective strategy. Analogously, some opponents (B\A) are sup-
posed to play plausibly (that complies to set ΥM together with the strategy
already chosen by A ∩ B), while the rest (Agt \ (A ∪ B)) have unrestricted
choice. In particular, when B = A, only the choices of the proponents are
restricted; for B = Agt \ A plausibility restrictions apply to the opponents
only.
Remark 5 Weobserve that our framework is semantically similar to the approach
of social laws [39, 34, 46]. However, we refer to strategy profiles as rational or
not, while social laws define constraints on agents’ individual actions. Also, our
motivation is different: In our framework, agents are expected to behave in a speci-
fied way because it is rational in some sense; social laws prescribe behaviour sanc-
tioned by social norms and legal regulations.
Example 11 (Asymmetricmatching pennies ctd.) Suppose that it is plau-
sible to expect that both agents are rational in the sense that they only play un-
dominated strategies.6 Then, Υ = {(sh , sh), (sh , st)}. Under this assumption,
agent 2 is free to grant itself with the prize or to refuse it: Pl (〈〈2〉〉3 money2 ∧
〈〈2〉〉2¬money2). Still, it cannot choose to win without making the other player win
too: Pl¬〈〈2〉〉3(money2 ∧ ¬money1). Likewise, if rationality is defined via iterated
undominated strategies, then we have Υ = {(sh , sh)}, and therefore the outcome
of the game is completely determined: Pl 〈〈∅〉〉2(¬start→ money1 ∧money2).
Note that, in order to include both notions of rationality in the model, we can
encode them as denotations of two different plausibility terms – say, ωundom and
ωiter, with [[ωundom]]q0 = {(sh , sh), (sh , st)}, and [[ωiter]]q0 = {(sh , sh)}. LetM ′1 be
model M1 with plausibility terms and their denotation defined as above. Then,
6 We recall from Section 2.1 that a strategy sa ∈ Σa is called undominated if, and only if,
there is no strategy s′a ∈ Σa such that the achieved utility of s′a is at least as good as for sa for
all counterstrategies s−a ∈ ΣAgt\{a} and strictly better for at least one counterstrategy s−a ∈
ΣAgt\{a}.
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we have that M ′1, q0 |= (set-pl ωundom)Pl (〈〈2〉〉3money2 ∧ 〈〈2〉〉2¬money2) ∧
(set-pl ωiter)Pl 〈〈∅〉〉2(¬start→ money1 ∧money2).
Out of many solution concepts, Nash equilibrium is the most widely ac-
cepted, especially for non-cooperative games. We briefly extend ourworking
example with game analysis based on Nash equilibrium. Note that, in this
case, it is not possible to define rationality with independent constraints on
agents’ individual strategies (like in normative systems). These are full strat-
egy profiles being rational or not, since rationality of a strategy depends on
the actual response of the other players.
Example 12 (Asymmetricmatching pennies ctd.) Suppose that rational-
ity is defined through Nash equilibria. Then, Υ = {(sh , sh), (st , st)}. Under this
assumption, agent 2 is sure to get the prize: Pl 〈〈∅〉〉2(¬start→ money2).
Moreover, by choosing the right strategy, 2 can control the outcome of the other
agent: Pl (〈〈2〉〉2(¬start → money1) ∧ 〈〈2〉〉2¬money1). Note that agent 1 can con-
trol her own outcome too, if we assume that the players are obliged to play ratio-
nally: Pl (〈〈1〉〉2(¬start → money1) ∧ 〈〈1〉〉2¬money1). This may seem strange,
but a Nash equilibrium assumes implicitly that the agents coordinate their actions
somehow. Then, assuming a particular choice of one agent in advance constrains
the other agent responses considerably, which puts the first agent at advantage.
Example 13 (Bargaining ctd.) LetωNE denote the set ofNash equilibria (ev-
ery payoff can be reached by a Nash equilibrium), and ωSPN the set of subgame
perfect Nash equilibria in the game. Then, the following holds for every x ∈ [0, 1]:
M ′2, q0 |=
(set-pl ωNE)〈〈1, 2〉〉3(px1 ∧ p1−x2 ) ∧ (set-pl ωSPN )〈〈∅〉〉3(p
1−δ2
1−δ1δ2
1 ∧ p
δ2(1−δ1)
1−δ1δ2
2 ).
where M ′2 is given by M2 extended by plausibility terms and their denotation as
introduced above.
Finally, we observe that the “plausibility refinement” operator (refn-pl ·)
can be used to combine several solution concepts, e.g.,
(set-pl ωNE)(refn-pl ωPO) restricts plausible play to Pareto optimal Nash
equilibria. We can also use (refn-pl ·) to compare different notions of ratio-
nality. For example, (set-pl ωNE)(refn-pl ωPO)〈〈Agt〉〉 h> can be used to
check if Pareto optimal NE’s exist in themodel at all.
The base language LbaseATLP allows to restrict the analysis to a subset of avail-
able strategy profiles. One drawback of LbaseATLP is that we cannot specify sets of
plausible/rational strategy profiles in the object language, simply because our
terms do not have any internal structure — they are just constants. Ideally,
one would like to have a flexible language of terms that allows to specify any
sensible rationality assumption, and then impose it on the system.
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Our first step is to employ formulae ofATLI andmake use of the results in
Section 3.4. The second step is to define a proper extension of LbaseATLP where
these concepts can be expressed, thus enabling both specification of plau-
sibility and reasoning about plausible behaviour to be conducted in ATLP.
The idea is to use ATLP formulae θ to specify sets of plausible strategy pro-
files, with the intendedmeaning thatΥ collects exactly theprofiles forwhich
θ holds. Then, we can embed such anATLP-based plausibility specification
in another formula ofATLP.
4.3 Plausibility Terms based onATLI
Definition 20 (LATLPATLI) LetΩ∗ = {(σ.θ) | θ ∈ LATLI(Agt,Π, {σ[1], . . . , σ[k]})}.
That is, Ω∗ collects terms of the form (σ.θ), where θ is an ATLI formula including
only references to individual agents’ parts of the strategy profile σ.7 The language
ofATLPATLI is defined as LbaseATLP(Agt,Π,Ω∗).
The idea behind terms of this form is simple. We have an ATLI formula
θ, parameterized with a variable σ that ranges over the set of strategy profiles
Σ. Now, we want (σ.θ) to denote exactly the set of profiles from Σ, for which
formula θ holds. However – as σ denotes a strategy profile, and ATLI allows
only to refer to strategies of individual agents – we need a way of addressing
substrategies of σ in θ. This can be done by usingATLI terms σ[i], which are
interpreted as i’s substrategy in σ.
For example, wemay assume that a rational agent does not grant the other
agentswith toomuch control over its life: (σ .
∧
a∈Agt((straσ[a])¬〈〈Agt \ {a}〉〉3deada)).
Note that games defined by CGS’s are, in general, not determined, so the
above specificationdoesnot guarantee that each rational agent can efficiently
protect her life. It only requires that she should behave cautiously so that her
opponents do not have complete power to kill her.
Definition 21 (Denotation of ATLI-based plausibility terms) LetM
be a CGS of the formM = 〈Agt,Q ,Π, pi, Act, d, o〉 and Ω∗ be as in Definition 20.
For each s ∈ Σwe defineMs to be the followingCGSwith intentions:
Ms = 〈Agt,Q ,Π, pi, Act, d, o, I0,Str, [·]〉
withStra = {σ[a]}, and [σ[a]] = s[a]. We recall from Section 3.4 that I0 represents
the full intention relation.
The plausibility mapping for terms from Ω∗ is defined as:
[[σ.θ]]q = {s ∈ Σ |Ms, q |= θ}.
It is now possible to plug in arbitrary ATLI specifications of rationality,
and reason about their consequences.
7 σ is the only variable in θ and refers to a strategy profile.
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Example 14 (Asymmetricmatching pennies ctd.) It seems that explicit
quantification over the opponents’ responses (not available inATLI) is essential to
express undominatedness of strategies (cf. [45] and Section 5.3). Still, we can at
least assume that a rational player should avoid playing strategies that guaran-
tee failure if a potentially successful strategy is available. Under this assumption,
player 1 should never play tail, and in consequence player 2 controls the outcome of
the game:
M ′′1 , q0 |= (set-pl σ.
∧
a∈Agt(〈〈Agt〉〉3moneya → (straσ[a])〈〈Agt〉〉3moneya))
Pl
(〈〈2〉〉3(money1 ∧money2) ∧ 〈〈2〉〉2¬(money1 ∧money2)).
where M ′′1 is the CGS M1 extended with propositions p1i ≡ moneyi, ATLI-based
plausibility terms, and their denotation according to Definition 21.
Moreover, if only Pareto optimal strategy profiles can be played, then both players
are bound to keep winning money:
M ′′1 , q0 |= (set-pl σ.PO3(σ))Pl 〈〈∅〉〉2(¬start→ money1 ∧money2).
Finally, restricting plausible strategy profiles to Nash equilibria guarantees that
player 2 should plausibly get money, but the outcome of player 1 is not determined:
M ′′1 , q0 |= (set-pl σ.NE3(σ))Pl
(〈〈∅〉〉2(¬start→ money2)
∧¬〈〈∅〉〉3money1 ∧ ¬〈〈∅〉〉2¬money1
)
.
Example 15 (Bargaining ctd.) For the bargaining agents and
κ = (1− δ2) 1−(δ1δ2)
T
2
1−δ1δ2 + (δ1δ2)
T
2 , we have accordingly:
1. M ′2, q0 |= (set-pl σ.NE3(σ))Pl 〈〈∅〉〉 h(px1 ∧ p1−x2 ) for every x;
2. M ′2, q0 |= (set-pl σ.SPN3(σ))Pl 〈〈∅〉〉 h(pκ1 ∧ p1−κ2 );
3. M ′2, q0 |= (set-pl σ.SPN3(σ))Pl 〈〈∅〉〉2(¬px11 ∧ ¬px22 ) for every x1 6= κ and
x2 6= 1− κ
whereM ′2 is theCGSP obtained fromCGSM2 by addingATLI-based plausibility
terms and their denotation.
Thus, we can encode a game as a CGSM , specify rationality assumptions
with an ATLI formula θ, and ask if a desired property ϕ of the system holds
under these assumptions by model checking (set-pl σ.θ)ϕ inM . Note that
the denotation of plausibility terms in Ω∗ is fixed. We report our results on
the complexity of solving such games in Section 6.
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4.4 Language LkATLP and L∞ATLP
As we have already explained, our main idea is to useATLP for both specifi-
cation of rationality assumptions and describtion of the outcome of rational
play. Thus, we need a possibility to embed anATLP formula ϕ (that defines
the rationality condition) in a “higher-level” formula of ATLP, as a part of
plausibility term (set-pl σ.ϕ). The reading of (set-pl σ.ϕ)ψ is, again: “Let
the plausibility set consist of profiles σ that satisfy ϕ; then, ψ holds”. Apart
from the possibility of nesting formulae via plausibility updates, we also pro-
pose to add quantifier-like structures to the language of terms. Consider, for
example, the term σ1.(∃σ2)ϕ. We would like to collect all strategies s1 such
that there is a strategy s2 for which ϕ holds (we use σi to refer to si). Thus,
σ1.(∃σ2)ϕ is supposed to act in a similar way as the first order logic-based set
specification {x | ∃y : ϕ(x, y)}. It is easy to see that e.g. the set of all undom-
inated strategies can now be specified in a straightforward way.
As before, the new version of ATLP is given over a set Agt = {a1, . . . , ak}
of agents, a set Π of propositions, and a set Ω of primitive plausibility terms
(cf. Section 3.4). In addition to these sets, we also include a set Var of strate-
gic variables. Variables in Var range over strategy profiles; we need them to
characterize specific rationality criteria, in a way similar to first order logic
specifications.
The definition of LATLP is given recursively. In each step the structure of
plausibility terms becomes more sophisticated. At first, we only consider
terms out of Ω; their interpretation is given in the model. On the next level,
we also allow plausibility terms to be quantifiedATLP formulae which con-
tain strategic variables and elements fromΩ. Plausibility terms of subsequent
levels can again be based on terms from the previous levels, and so forth. In
consequence, the core 0-level language of our new ATLP is almost the same
as the base language LbaseATLP defined in Section 4.1: It extends it with simple
combinations of terms.
In general, all the levels of the language canbe seen as containingordinary
formulae of the original ATLP, the only thing that changes as we move to
higher levels is the complexity of plausibility terms. We begin with defining
simple combinations of plausibility terms, and then present the hierarchy
of languages LkATLP, with the underlying idea that LkATLP allows for at most k
(k ∈ N0) nested plausibility updates. The full language LATLP allows for any
arbitrary finite number of nestings.
Definition 22 (Strategic combination) LetAgt denote a set of agents and
X be a non-empty set of symbols. We say that y is a strategic combination of x if
it is generated by the following grammar:
y ::= x | 〈y, . . . , y〉 | y[A]
where x ∈ X, 〈y, . . . , y〉 is a vector of length |Agt|, andA ⊆ Agt. The set of strate-
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gic combinations over X is defined by T(X). It is easy to see that operator T is
idempotent (T(X) = T(T(X))).
The intuition is that elements of x ∈ X are symbols in the object language
that refer to sets of strategy profiles, and the elements of T(X) allow to com-
bine these sets to new sets.8 Let x refer to a set of strategy profiles χ ⊆ Σ.
Then, x[A] refers to all the profiles in Σ in which A’s substrategy agrees with
some profile from χ. Similarly, if x1, . . . , xk denote sets of strategy profiles
χ1, . . . , χk, then 〈x1, . . . , xk〉 refers to all the profiles that agree on ai’s strategy
with at least one profile from χi for each i = 1, . . . , k.
Definition 23 (LkATLP) Let Agt be a set of agents, Π a set of propositions, Ω be
a set of primitive plausibility terms, and Var a set of strategic variables (with
typical element σ). The logicsLkATLP(Agt,Π,Var,Ω), k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , are recursively
defined as follows:
• L0ATLP(Agt,Π,Var,Ω) = LbaseATLP(Agt,Π,Ω0), where Ω0 = T(Ω);
• LkATLP(Agt,Π,Var,Ω) = LbaseATLP(Agt,Π,Ωk), where:
Ωk = T(Ωk−1 ∪ Ωk),
Ωk = {σ1.(Q2σ2) . . . (Qnσn)ϕ | n ∈ N,∀i (1 ≤ i ≤ n⇒
σi ∈ Var, Qi ∈ {∀,∃}, ϕ ∈ LbaseATLP(Agt,Π, T(Ωk−1 ∪ {σ1, . . . , σn}))) }.
Thus, plausibility terms on level k (i.e., Ωk) augment terms from the pre-
vious level (Ωk−1) with new terms Ωk that combine quantification over strate-
gic variables σ1, . . . σn with formulae possibly containing these strategic variables.
Such terms are used to collect (or describe) specific strategy profiles (referred
to by variable σ1 which plays a distinctive role in comparison with the other
variables).
Definition 24 (LATLP) The set of ATLP formulae with arbitrary finite nesting
of plausibility terms is defined by
LATLP = L∞ATLP(Agt,Π,Var,Ω) = lim
k→∞
LkATLP(Agt,Π,Var,Ω).
Definition 25 (k-formula, k-term) Formula ϕ ∈ L∞ATLP(Agt,Π,Var,Ω) is
called anATLPk-formula (or simply k-formula) if, and only if,ϕ ∈ LkATLP(Agt,Π,Var,Ω).
Analogously, a plausibility term occurring in a k-formula is called a k-term.
Remark 6 We use the acronym ATLP to refer to both the full language L∞ATLP
and the basic sublanguage LbaseATLP.
8 This correspondence will be given formally in Definition 26 (Section 4.5).
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Example 16 (Illustrating plausibility terms in LkATLP) Belowwe present
some simple formulae illustrating the different levels of our logic.
LbaseATLP: (set-pl ωNE)Pl 〈〈A〉〉γ; group A can enforce γ if only Nash equilibria are
played (we assume that ωNE denotes exactly the set of Nash equilibria in the
model).
L0ATLP: (set-pl 〈ωNE, . . . , ωNE〉)Pl 〈〈A〉〉γ; plausibility terms can be combined. Note
the difference to the previous formula, agents are assumed to play a strategy
which is part of someNE. The resulting strategy profile does not have to be a
Nash equilibrium, though.
L1ATLP: ϕ ≡ (set-pl σ.∃σ1ϕ′(σ, σ1))Pl 〈〈A〉〉γ where ϕ′(σ, σ1) is a formula pos-
sibly containing operators (set-pl ω) with ω ∈ T(Ω ∪ {σ, σ1}); e.g. ϕ′ ≡
(set-pl 〈σ, . . . σ, σ1, ωNE〉)
Pl 〈〈A〉〉γ′. We will have a closer look at the (set-pl ·) operator in ϕ. The
operator collects all strategies σ such that there exists another strategy profile
σ1 for which Pl 〈〈A〉〉γ′ holds if all but the last 2 agents play according to σ,
the second to last agent plays according to σ1, and the last one according to a
fixed strategy out of ωNE.
L2ATLP: Consider the previous formula ϕ again, but this time ϕ′(σ, σ1) can also
contain quantification; e.g. ϕ′ ≡ ((set-pl 〈σ, . . . , σ, σ1, ωNE〉)Pl 〈〈B〉〉γ′) →
(
(set-pl σ′.∃σ′1ϕ′′(σ′, σ′1))Pl 〈〈A〉〉γ) where ϕ′′(σ′, σ′1) is a base formula with
plausibility terms taken from T(Ω ∪ {σ′, σ′1}).
In the next section we show how the denotation of complex terms is con-
structed, and how it is plugged into the semantics ofATLP from Section 4.2.
4.5 Semantics of LkATLP and L∞ATLP
LkATLP does not change the very structure of ATLP formulae, it only extends
LbaseATLP by more ornate plausibility terms. Therefore, it seems natural that the
plausibilitymapping for theses terms is of particular interest; the denotation
reflects the construction of strategic combinations given in Definition 22.
Definition 26 (Extended plausibilitymapping [̂[·]]) LetM ∈ CGSP (Agt,Π,Ω).
The extended plausibility mapping [̂[·]]M with respect to [[·]]M is defined as fol-
lows:
1. If ω ∈ Ω then [̂[ω]]qM = [[ω]]qM ;
2. If ω = ω′[A] then [̂[ω]]
q
M = {s ∈ Σ | ∃s′ ∈ [̂[ω′]]
q
M s|A = s′|A};
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3. If ω = 〈ω1, . . . ωk〉 then [̂[ω]]
q
M = {s ∈ Σ | ∃t1 ∈ [̂[ω1]]
q
M , . . . ,∃tk ∈ [̂[ωk]]
q
M∀i =
1, ..., k s|ai = ti|ai)};
4. If ω = σ1.(Q2σ2) . . . (Qnσn)ϕ then
[̂[ω]]
q
M = {s1 ∈ Σ | Q2s2 ∈ Σ, . . . , Qnsn ∈ Σ (Ms1,...,sn , q |= ϕ)},
whereMs1,...,sn is equal toM except that we fixΥMs1,...,sn = Σ,ΩMs1,...,sn =
ΩM ∪ {σ1, . . . , σn}, [[σi]]qMs1,...,sn = {si}, and [[ω]]qMs1,...,sn = [[ω]]qM for all
ω 6= σi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and q ∈ QM . That is, the denotation of σi inMs1,...,sn is
set to strategy profile si.9
Consider, for instance, plausibility term σ1.∀σ2ϕ. The extended plausibil-
ity mapping ̂[[σ1.∀σ2ϕ]]q collects all strategy profiles s1 ∈ Σ (referred to by σ1)
such that for all strategy profiles s2 ∈ Σ (referred to by σ2) ϕ is true in model
Ms1,s2 and state q ∈ Q , i.e.Ms1,s2 , q |= ϕ for all s2 ∈ Σ.
Remark 7 Note that if the language includes a term ω> that refers to all strategy
profiles, then x[A] can be expressed as 〈ω1, . . . , ωk〉, where ωa = xa for a ∈ A, and
ωa = ω> otherwise. We also observe that in LkATLP, k > 0, ω> can be expressed as
σ.>.
In Definition 18 we defined the semantics of the base language of ATLP.
Truth of LkATLP formulae is defined in the same way, we only need to replace
the previous (simple) plausibility mapping by the extended one in the se-
mantics of plausibility updates.
Definition 27 (Semantics of LkATLP and L∞ATLP) The semantics forLATLP for-
mulae is given as inDefinition 18with the extended plausibilitymapping [̂[·]]M used
instead of [[·]]M . I.e., only the semantic clauses for (set-pl ω)ϕ and (refn-pl ω)ϕ
change as follows:
M, q |=B (set-pl ω)ϕ iffM ′, q |=B ϕ where the new modelM ′ is equal toM but
the new setΥM ′ of plausible strategy profiles is set to [̂[ω]]
q
M ;
M, q |=B (refn-pl ω)ϕ iff M ′, q |=B ϕ where the new model M ′ is equal to M
but the new setΥM ′ of plausible strategy profiles is set toΥM ∩ [̂[ω]]
q
M .
Remark 8 By a slight abuse of notation, we will refer to the extended plausibility
mapping with the same symbol as to the simple plausibility mapping, i.e., with [[·]].
Wewill discuss some important examples ofLATLP formulae and terms (to-
gether with their interpretation) in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 where ATLP char-
acterizations of solution concepts are presented.
9 It should be emphasized that modelMs1,...,sn in which plausibility of profile s1 is evalu-
ated does not presuppose any notion of plausibility, i.e.,ΥMs1,...,sn = Σ.
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5 Properties of ATLP
This section contains our main conceptual results. We show:
1. That several logics can be embedded into ATLP by means of polyno-
mial translation of models and/or formulae (Section 5.1),
2. That several classical solution concepts for extensive games (Nash equi-
libria, subgameperfectNash equilibria, ParetoOptimality), canbe char-
acterized inATLP already in the language L1ATLP (Section 5.2),
3. That these solution concepts can be also re-formulated in a qualitative
way, through appropriate formulae of ATLP parameterized by ATL
path formulae (Section 5.3).
5.1 Embedding Existing Logics into ATLP
In this section, we compareATLPwith several related logics and show their
formal relationships. To this end, we first define notions that allow to com-
pare expressivity of logical systems. Embedding takes place on the level of
satisfaction relations (|=): Logic L1 embeds L2 if models and formulae of L2
can be simulated in L1 in a truth-preserving way. Subsumption refers to the
level of valid sentences: L1 subsumesL2 if all the validities ofL2 are validities
of L1 as well.
Definition 28 (Embedding) LogicL1 embeds logicL2 iff there is a transla-
tion tr of L2 formulae into formulae of L1, and a transformation TR of L2 models
into models of L1, such thatM, q |=L2 ϕ iff TR(M), q |=L1 tr(ϕ) for every pointed
modelM, q and formula ϕ of L2.
Note that the translation of formulae and transformation of models are
supposed to be independent. This prevents translation schemes that trans-
form triples M, q |= ϕ in L2 to M ′, q |= >, and triples M, q 6|= ϕ in L2 to
M ′, q 6|= ⊥ (with an arbitrary model M ′), that would yield embeddings be-
tween any pair of logics.
It is important to point out that all the transformation and translation
schemes proposed in this section can be computed in polynomial time and
incur only polynomial increase in the size of models and the length of for-
mulae. Thus, we are in fact interested in polynomial embeddings of logics in
ATLP.
Definition 29 (Subsumption) LogicL1 subsumes logicL2 iff the set of va-
lidities of L1 subsumes validities of L2.
Proposition 9 ATLP embedsATL.
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Proof We use the identity translation of formulae: tr(ϕ) ≡ ϕ. As for models,
TR(M) = M ′ that extendsM with an arbitrary set of plausible strategy pro-
filesΥ. It is easy to see that the plausibility assumptionsΥ will never be used
in the evaluation of ϕ since ϕ includes no Pl operators. Thus, the result of
the evaluation will be the same as forM, q |= ϕ. 
The above reasoning implies also that ATL validities hold for all ATLP
models.
Corollary 10 ATLP subsumesATL.
The relationship of ATLP to most other logics can be studied only in the
context of embedding, as they use different modal operators (and thus yield
incomparable sets of valid formulae). We begin with embedding “ATLwith
Intentions” [30] inATLP. Then,we show that “CTLwithPlausibility” from [10]
can be embedded inATLP for a limited (but very natural) class ofmodels. Fi-
nally, we propose an embedding of the two existing versions of Game Logic
with Preferences [50, 51] which allow to reason about what can happen un-
der particular game-theoretical rationality assumptions.
Proposition 11 ATLP embedsATLI.
Proof sketch For an ATLI model M = 〈Agt,Q ,Π, pi, Act, d, o, I,Str, [·]〉, we
construct the corresponding concurrent game structurewithplausibilityTR(M) =
〈Agt,Q ,Π, pi, Act, d, o,Υ,Ω, [[·]]〉with the set of plausible strategy profiles Υ =
{s ∈ Σ | s is consistent with I}, plausibility terms Ω = {ωσ | σ ∈ Str} ∪ {ω>},
and their denotation [[ω>]]q = Σ and [[ωσ]]q = {s ∈ Σ | s|a = [σ]} for each
σ ∈ Stra.
For an ATLI formula ϕ, we construct its ATLP translation by transform-
ing strategic assumptions (about agents’ intentions) imposed by (straσ) to
plausibility assumptions (about strategyprofiles that canbeplausibly played)
defined by (set-pl ωσ) and applying them to the appropriate set of agents
(i.e., those for whom strategic assumptions have been defined). Formally,
the translation is defined as tr(ϕ) = Pl tr〈ω>,...,ω>〉(ϕ), where tr〈ω1,...,ωk〉 is de-
fined as follows:
tr〈ω1,...,ωk〉(p) = p,
tr〈ω1,...,ωk〉(¬ϕ) = ¬tr〈ω1,...,ωk〉(ϕ),
tr〈ω1,...,ωk〉(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = tr〈ω1,...,ωk〉(ϕ1) ∧ tr〈ω1,...,ωk〉(ϕ2),
tr〈ω1,...,ωk〉(〈〈A〉〉 hϕ) = 〈〈A〉〉 htr〈ω1,...,ωk〉(ϕ),
(for 〈〈A〉〉2ϕ and 〈〈A〉〉ϕ1Uϕ2 analogously)
tr〈ω1,...,ωk〉((straσ
′
a)ϕ) = (set-pl
−→ω )tr−→ω (ϕ),
where −→ω = 〈ω1, . . . , ωσ′a , . . . , ωk〉.
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Note that, for “vanilla” ATLI, 〈〈A〉〉γ holds iff γ can be enforced against
every response strategy from Agt \ A. Thus, e.g.,M, q |=ATLI (straσa)〈〈A〉〉2p iff
TR(M), q |=ATLP Pl (set-pl 〈ω>, . . . , ωσa , . . . , ω>〉)〈〈A〉〉2p, and analogously for
the other cases. 
CTLP, i.e., “CTLwith Plausibility” [10], is an extension of the branching-
time logic CTL with a similar notion of plausibility as the one we use here.
The main difference lies in the fact that CTLP formulae refer to plausible
paths rather than strategy profiles.
Proposition 12 ATLP embedsCTLP in the class of transition systems.
Proof sketch To transform models, we first observe that every transition sys-
temM can be seen as a concurrent game structure that includes only a single
agent a1. Furthermore, we can transform M to a CGSP TR(M) by adding
Υ = Σ and Ω = ∅ (cf. Section 4.1). To translate CTLP formulae, we use the
scheme below:
tr(ϕ) = tr(set-pl σ.>)(ϕ)
trω(p) = p, trω(¬ϕ) = ¬trω(ϕ), trω(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = trω(ϕ1) ∧ trω(ϕ2),
trω(Eγ) = 〈〈Agt〉〉trω(γ),
trω( hϕ) = htrω(ϕ) (for2ϕ and ϕ1Uϕ2 analogously);
trω(Plϕ) = (set-pl ω)Pl trω(ϕ),
trω(Phϕ) = Ph trω(ϕ),
trω((set-pl γ)ϕ) = trω′(ϕ),
where ω′ = σ.(set-pl σ)Pl 〈〈∅〉〉γ.
Now,M, q |=CTLP ϕ iffM, q |=ATLP tr(ϕ).
Note that we cannot use the above construction for arbitrary models of
CTLP, as not every set of (plausible) paths can be obtained by memoryless
strategy profiles. 
Proposition 13 ATLP cannot be polynomially embedded in neither ATL, nor
ATLI, norCTLP.
Proof Suppose that any of these logics polynomially embeds ATLP. Then,
the embedding provides a polynomial reduction of model checking from
ATLP to that logic. Since model checking of ATL, ATLI, and CTLP can
be done in polynomial deterministic time [3, 30, 10], we get that the prob-
lem forATLP is inP, too. But model checkingATLP is∆P3 -hard already for
LbaseATLP (see Section 6).
There is notmuchwork on logical descriptions of behaviour of agents un-
der rationality assumptions based on game-theoretical solution concepts. In
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fact, we know only of one such logic for agents with perfect information,
which is GLP from [51]. There, agents can be assumed qualitative prefer-
ences (i.e., a propositional formula ϕ0 that they supposedly want to make
eventually true). Moreover, they are assumed to play rationally in the sense
that if they have some strategies that guarantee3ϕ0, they can use only those
strategies in their play. Interestingly enough, the preference criterion was
different in a preliminary version ofGLP [50], where it was based on the no-
tion of Nash equilibrium. Both versions ofGLP can be embedded inATLP.
One may embed game logics with other preference criteria in an analogous
way.
Proposition 14 GLP can be embedded inATLP.
Proof sketch For the translation of models, we transform game trees of GLP
to concurrent game structures using the construction from Section 3.3, and
transform the CGS to CGSP by taking Υ = Σ and Ω = ∅. Then, we use the
following translation ofGLP formulae:
tr(ϕ) = Pl tr(set-pl σ.>)(ϕ),
trω(p) = p, trω(¬ϕ) = ¬trω(ϕ), trω(ϕ ∨ ψ) = trω(ϕ) ∨ trω(ψ),
trω(2ϕ0) = 〈〈∅〉〉3ϕ0,
trω([a : ϕ0]ψ) = (set-pl ω′)trω′(ψ),
where ω′ = σ.Pl (set-pl ω)〈〈∅〉〉2(plausible(σ) ∧ prefers(a, σ, ϕ0))
plausible(σ) ≡ (refn-pl σ)〈〈Agt〉〉 h>
prefers(a, σ, ϕ0) ≡ 〈〈a〉〉3ϕ0 → (refn-pl σ[a])〈〈∅〉〉3ϕ0.
That is, with each subsequent preference operator [a : ϕ0], only those from
the (currently) plausible strategy profiles are selected that are preferred by a.
The preference is based on the (subgame perfect) enforceability of the out-
come ϕ0 at the end of the game: if ϕ0 can be enforced at all, then a prefers
strategies that do enforce it.
Now, we have that Γ |=GLP ϕ iff TR(Γ), ∅ |=ATLP tr(ϕ).10 
Proposition 15 PreliminaryGLP can be embedded inATLP.
Proof Analogous to Proposition 14. The translation only differs in the char-
acterization of agents’ preferences. The agents are now assumed to stick to
their individual parts of Nash equilibria defined by a zero-sum gamewhere a
10 Again, ∅ denotes the position with empty history, i.e., the initial state of the game.
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wins iff ϕ0 is enforced:11
ω′ = σ.∃σ′Pl (set-pl ω)〈〈∅〉〉2(
plausible(σ) ∧NE(σ′, a, ϕ0) ∧ coincides(σ, σ′, a)
)
plausible(σ) ≡ (refn-pl σ)〈〈Agt〉〉 h>
coincides(σ, σ′, a) ≡ (set-pl σ[a])(refn-pl σ′[a])〈〈Agt〉〉 h>
NE(σ, a, ϕ0) ≡
∧
i∈Agt
BRi(σ, a, ϕ0),
BRi(σ, a, ϕ0) ≡

(refn-pl σ[Agt \ {i}])〈〈i〉〉3ϕ0
→ (refn-pl σ)〈〈∅〉〉3ϕ0 for i = a
(refn-pl σ[Agt \ {i}])〈〈i〉〉2¬ϕ0
→ (refn-pl σ)〈〈∅〉〉2¬ϕ0 i 6= a

A couple other logics were defined for various solution concepts with re-
spect to incomplete information games [49, 48]. We do not study themhere,
since our framework lacks the notions of knowledge and uncertainty – but it
seems a promising area of future research.
Remark 16 We have presented embeddings of several quite different logics into
ATLP, which suggests substantial gain in expressive power. Most of them (ATL,
ATLI, andCTLP) are embedded already in the lowest levels of theATLP hierarchy
(i.e., LbaseATLP or L1ATLP with no quantifiers). GLP formulae with at most k preference
operators are embedded in LkATLP, which is inevitable given their semantics that
combines model update and irrevocable strategic quantification (cf. the discussion
and the complexity results in [1, 7]).
5.2 Classical Solution Concepts in L1ATLP
In Section 3.3we showed how extensive games Γ (with a finite set of utilities)
can be expressed by CGS’s: each Γ can be transformed in a CGSM(Γ) such
that they correspond (in the sense of Definition 8).
The following terms rewrite the specificationof best response profiles, Nash
equilibria, and the specificationof subgame-perfectNash equilibria fromSec-
tion 3.4. Note that the new specifications use onlyATLP operators.
BRTa (σ) ≡ (set-pl σ[Agt \ {a}])Pl
∧
v∈U
(
(〈〈a〉〉Tpva)→ (set-pl σ)〈〈∅〉〉Tpva
)
NET (σ) ≡
∧
a∈Agt
BRTa (σ)
SPNT (σ) ≡ 〈〈∅〉〉2NET (σ)
11 Note the similarity of the scheme below to the characterization of qualitative Nash equilib-
rium in Section 5.3.
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Recalling briefly the ideas behind the above specifications, BRTa (σ) holds
iff σ[a] is the best response to σ[Agt \ {a}]. That is, after we fix the Agt \ {a}’s
collective strategy to σ[Agt\{a}], agent a cannot obtain a better temporal pat-
tern of payoffs than by playing σ[a]. Then, σ is a Nash equilibrium if each in-
dividual strategy s[a] is the best response to the opponent’s strategies σ[Agt \
{a}] (cf. [35]). The formalization of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is
straightforward: We require profile σ to be a Nash equilibrium in all reach-
able states (seen as initial positions of particular subgames).
The following propositions are simple adaptations of the results from Sec-
tion 3.4.
Proposition 17 Let Γ be an extensive game with a finite set of utilities. Then
the following holds:
1. s ∈ [[σ.NE3(σ)]]∅M(Γ) iff s is a Nash equilibrium in Γ.
2. s ∈ [[σ.SPN3(σ)]]∅M(Γ) iff s is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in Γ.
In Section 3.4we defined a quantitative version of Pareto optimality formu-
lated inATLI. However, as we pointed out, theATLI formula had exponen-
tial length and some counterintuitive implications. Quantification allows to
propose a more compact and intuitive specification:
POT (σ) ≡ ∀σ′ Pl
( ∧
a∈Agt
∧
v∈U
(
(set-pl σ′)〈〈∅〉〉Tpva → (set-pl σ)〈〈∅〉〉Tpva
) ∨
∨
a∈Agt
∨
v∈U
(
(set-pl σ)〈〈∅〉〉Tpva ∧ ¬(set-pl σ′)〈〈∅〉〉Tpva
))
.
This definition of Pareto optimality ismore intuitive than the one given in
Section 3.4 because it does not focus on temporal evolution of whole payoff
profiles, but rather on the interaction between temporal patterns of individ-
ual patterns.
Proposition 18 Let Γ be an extensive game with a finite set of utilities. Then:
s ∈ [[σ.PO3(σ)]]∅M(Γ) iff s is Pareto optimal in Γ.
Let 〈xA, yAgt\A〉 be a shorthand for the term 〈z1, . . . , zk〉with za = x for a ∈
A and za = y otherwise. The following specification, formulated as an L1ATLP
formula, characterizes the set of strategy profiles that include undominated
strategies for agent a:
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UNDOM T (σ) ≡ ∀σ1∀σ2∃σ3
Pl
( ∧
v∈U
(
(set-pl 〈σ{a}1 , σAgt\{a}2 〉)〈〈∅〉〉Tpva → (set-pl 〈σ{a}, σAgt\{a}2 〉)〈〈∅〉〉Tpva
)
∨
∨
v∈U
(
(set-pl 〈σ{a}, σAgt\{a}3 〉)〈〈∅〉〉Tpva ∧ ¬(set-pl 〈σ{a}1 , σAgt\{a}3 〉)〈〈∅〉〉Tpva
))
.
Proposition 19 Let Γ be an extensive game with a finite set of utilities. Then
s ∈ [[σ.UNDOM3(σ)]]∅M(Γ) iff s|a is undominated in Γ.
5.3 General Solution Concepts in L1ATLP
In this section, we return to the idea of general solution concepts from Sec-
tion 3.5 and show how qualitative versions of NE, SPN, PO andUNDOM can
be captured in ATLP. Like for temporalized solution concepts, it turns out
that their qualitative counterparts canbe already specified inL1ATLP(Agt,Π, ∅).
That is, we need only one level of nested plausibility updates (and no “hard-
wired” plausibility terms) to effectively capture classical notions of rational-
ity and extend them tomore general games that we study in this paper.
We only consider one “winning condition” per agent to represent agents’
preferences, but this view can be naturally extended to full preference lists,
as in Section 3.5. Inwhat follows, let−→η = 〈η1, . . . , ηk〉 be a vector ofLATL path
formulae.
Definition 30 (Transforming a CGSP into a NFGame) LetM ∈ CGSP(Agt,Π,Ω)
and q ∈ QM . The associated NF game S(M,−→η , q)with respect to−→η is given as in
Definition 11 withM interpreted as a pureCGS by removingΥ and [[·]] from it.
Our aim is to define analogues of classical solution concepts (Nash equi-
libria and such) that are based on explicit “winning conditions” ηi instead
of numerical payoffs. We can build on our results from the previous section;
we only need to replace temporal patterns of payoffs with the formulae ηi:
BR
−→η
a (σ) ≡ (set-pl σ[Agt\{a}])Pl
(〈〈a〉〉ηa → (set-pl σ)〈〈∅〉〉ηa)
NE
−→η (σ) ≡
∧
a∈Agt
BR
−→η
a (σ)
SPN
−→η (σ) ≡ 〈〈∅〉〉2NE−→η (σ)
PO
−→η (σ) ≡ ∀σ′ Pl
( ∧
a∈Agt
((set-pl σ′)〈〈∅〉〉ηa → (set-pl σ)〈〈∅〉〉ηa) ∨
∨
a∈Agt
((set-pl σ)〈〈∅〉〉ηa ∧ ¬(set-pl σ′)〈〈∅〉〉ηa
)
.
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UNDOM
−→η (σ) ≡ ∀σ1∀σ2∃σ3 Pl((
(set-pl 〈σ{a}1 , σAgt\{a}2 〉)〈〈∅〉〉ηa → (set-pl 〈σ{a}, σAgt\{a}2 〉)〈〈∅〉〉ηa
)
∨ ((set-pl 〈σ{a}, σAgt\{a}3 〉)〈〈∅〉〉ηa ∧ ¬(set-pl 〈σ{a}1 , σAgt\{a}3 〉)〈〈∅〉〉ηa)).
The intuitions behind these concepts are the same as in the quantitative
case. Note that we did not have to include the big conjunctions/disjunctions
over all possible utility values in the case of Pareto optimal and undominated
strategies. This is because the corresponding NF game can be seen as a game
with only two possible outcomes per agent.
The following proposition shows thatNE
−→η , PO
−→η , andUNDOM
−→η indeed
extend the classical notions of Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimal strategy
profile, and undominated strategy.
Proposition 20
1. The set ofNash equilibrium strategies inS(M,−→η , q) is given by [[σ.NE−→η (σ)]]qM .
2. The set of Pareto optimal strategies in S(M,−→η , q) is given by [[σ.PO−→η (σ)]]qM .
3. The set of a’s undominated strategies inS(M,−→η , q) is given by ([[σ.UNDOM−→η (σ)]]qM)|a.
SubgameperfectNash equilibria cannot be directly related to normal form
games, but we can state the following.
Proposition 21 LetQ ′ be the set of states reachable from q inM . Then, [[σ.SPNη(σ)]]qM =⋂
q∈Q′ [[σ.NE
η(σ)]]qM .
Example 17 (Extendedmatching pennies) In Figure 7we consider a slightly
more complex version of the asymmetric matching pennies game presented in
Figure 5. The new game consists of two phases (played ad infinitum). Firstly,
player 1 wins some money if the sides of the pennies match, otherwise the money
goes to player 2. In the second phase, both win a prize if both show heads; if they
both show tails, only player 2wins. If they show different sides, nobody wins.
We denote particular strategies as sα1α2 , where α1 is the action played at state
q0, and α2 is the action played at states q1, q2 (it is not necessary to consider strate-
gies that specify different actions in q1 and q2, since the outgoing transitions in
q2 are exact copies of those in q1). Note that every combination of strategies (i.e.,
every strategy profile) determines a single temporal path. For example, if agent 1
plays sht and agent 2 plays stt, then they both ensure the (infinite) temporal path
q0q2q5q0q2q5 . . .
Let us additionally assume that the winning conditions are: η1 ≡ 2(¬start →
money1) for player 1 and η2 ≡ 3money2 for player 2. That is, agent 1 is only happy
DEPARTMENTOF INFORMATICS 40
REASONING ABOUT TEMPORAL PROPERTIES OF RATIONAL PLAY
(A)
q0 start
q1
money1
q2
money2
q3
money1
money2
q4 q5
money2
h
h
tt h
t
th
h
h
h
tth
tthh
h
t
th
tt
n
n
n
n
n
n
(B)
η1\η2 shh sht sth stt
shh 1,1 0, 0 0, 1 0, 1
sht 0, 0 0, 1 0, 1 0, 1
sth 0, 1 0, 1 1,1 0, 0
stt 0, 1 0, 1 0, 0 0, 1
Figure 7: “Extended matching pennies”: (A) CGS M3; again, action profile
xy refers to action x played by player 1 and action y played by 2. (B) Strate-
gies and their outcomes for η1 ≡ 2(¬start → money1), η2 ≡ 3money2. Pareto
optimal profiles are indicatedwith bold font, Nash equilibria with grey back-
ground.
if she gets money all the time (whenever possible). Agent 2 is more minimalistic: it
is sufficient for him to winmoney once, sometime in the future. So, for instance, the
play that results from strategy profile 〈sht, stt〉 satisfies the second player, but not
the first one. This way, it is easy to construct a table of binary payoffs that indicates
which strategy profiles are “winning” for whom, like the table in Figure 7B. Now, we
can for instance observe that profile 〈sht, stt〉 is a Nash equilibrium (player 1 can-
not make herself happy by unilaterally changing her strategy), but it is not Pareto
optimal (〈shh, shh〉 and 〈sth, sth〉 yield strictly better payoff profiles). As before, the
CGSM3 in Figure 7A can be seen as a CGSP by adding Υ = Σ and Ω = ∅. Now,
we have that:
• [[σ.NEη1,η2(σ)]]q0M3 = {〈shh, shh〉, 〈shh, stt〉, 〈sht, sht〉, 〈sht, stt〉, 〈sth, sht〉, 〈sth, sth〉,〈stt, sht〉, 〈stt, stt〉}, and
• [[σ.POη1,η2(σ)]]q0M3 = {〈shh, shh〉, 〈sth, sth〉}.
Suppose that agent 1 wants money always, and 2 wants money eventually, and
only Pareto optimal Nash equilibria are played. Then, agent 1 is bound to get
money at the beginning of each round of the game. Formally:
M3, q0 |= (set-pl σ.NEη1,η2(σ))(refn-pl σ.POη1,η2(σ))Pl (start→ 〈〈∅〉〉 hmoney1).
In ATLP, we can also describe relationships between different solution
concepts in a CGS. For example, in the “extendedmatching pennies” game,
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all Pareto optimal profiles happen to be in Nash equilibrium, which is equiv-
alent to the following formula:
(set-pl σ.POη1,η2(σ))(refn-pl σ.¬NEη1,η2(σ))Pl¬〈〈Agt〉〉 h>,
and the formula does indeed hold inM3, q0.
6 Model Checking ATLP
In this sectionwediscuss themodel checking complexity ofATLP. Themodel
checking problem refers to the question whether a given formula holds in a
givenmodel and state. The size of the input is usually measured in the num-
ber of transitions in the model (m) and the length of the formula (l). Note
that the problem of checking ATLP with respect to the size of the whole
CGSP (including the plausibility set Υ), is trivially linear in the size of the
model: The model size is exponential with respect to the number of states and
transitions. Hence, model checking CGSP’s does not make sense if the set
of plausible strategies is stored explicitly. The set should be stored implicitly;
for instance, bymeans of some decision procedure. Wewill assume through-
out this section that the plausibility setΥ does not discriminate any strategy
profiles (i.e., all strategy profiles are initially plausible), and actual plausibil-
ity assumptions must be specified in the object language through (simple or
complex) plausibility terms.
The same remark applies to the denotations of primitive (“hard-wired”)
plausibility terms. In this respect, we will consider two subclasses of CGSP’s
in which the representation of plausibility assumptions of plausibility as-
sumptions does not overwhelm the complexity of the rest of the input –
namely, pure concurrent game structures and so called “well-behaved”CGSP’s.
In pure CGS’s, plausibility terms and their denotations are simply absent.
In well-behaved CGS’s, we put a limit on the complexity of the plausibil-
ity check, i.e., the computational resources needed to determine whether a
given strategy is plausible according to a given plausibility term and plausi-
bility mapping.
Definition 31 (CGS as CGSP) As before, we will take each CGS to be an im-
plicit representation ofCGSPwhere all strategy profiles are initially plausible (Υ =
Σ) and there are no “hardwired” plausibility terms (Ω = ∅).
Definition 32 (Well-Behaved CGSP) A CGSP M is called well-behaved
if, and only if,
1. ΥM = Σ: all the strategy profiles are plausible inM ;
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2. There is anNP-algorithm (with respect to l andm) which determineswhether
s ∈ [[ω]]qM for every state q ∈ QM , strategy profile s ∈ Σ, and plausibility term
ω ∈ Ω.
Remark 22 We note that, if a list (or several alternative lists) of plausible strat-
egy profiles is given explicitly in the model (via the plausibility set Υ and/or the
denotations of abstract plausibility terms ω from Section 4), then the problem of
guessing an appropriate strategy from such a list is in NP (memoryless strategies
have polynomial size with respect tom). Consequently, we assume that, if such a
list is given explicitly, that it is stored outside the model.
We begin our study with the complexity of model checking the basic lan-
guage LbaseATLP in Section 6.1. Then, we investigate the complexity for the in-
termediate language LATLPATLI (Section 6.2). It turns out that the problem is
in both cases∆P3 -complete in general, which seems in line with existing re-
sults on the complexity of solving games. In particular, it is known that if
both players in a 2-player imperfect information game have imperfect recall,
and chancemoves are allowed, then the problem of finding amax-min pure
strategy is ΣP2 -complete [31].12 That is, there are established results within
game theorywhich show that reasoning about the outcome of a gamewhere
the strategies of both parties are restricted cannot be easier than ΣP2 (resp.
∆P3 when nesting of game specifications is allowed). In the light of this, our
complexity results are not as pessimistic as they seem, especially asATLP al-
lows specification of much more diverse restrictions than those imposed by
imperfect information in 2-player turn-based games.13
Moreover, we show in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 that model checking LbaseATLP and
LATLPATLI is∆P2 -complete if only theproponents’ strategies are restricted. This,
again, corresponds to some well-knownNP-hardness results for solving ex-
tensive games with imperfect information and recall [12, 17, 31].
Finally, in Section 6.3 we study the model checking complexity of LkATLP
and L∞ATLP. We summarize the results in Section 6.4.
6.1 Model Checking LbaseATLP
In this section we show that model checking LbaseATLP is ∆P3 -complete in gen-
eral, and∆P2 -complete when only the proponents’ strategies are restricted.
Moreover, model checking LbaseATLP over rectangular models and models with
bounded plausibility sets can be done in polynomial time.
12Note that strategic operators can be nested in anATLP formula, thus specifying a sequence
of games, with the outcome of each game depending on the previous ones—and solving such
games requires adaptive calls to aΣP2 oracle.
13 In particular, imperfect information strategies (sometimes called uniform strategies) can be
characterized inATLP for a relevant subclass of models, cf. Section 6.1.2.
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functionmcheckATLP(M, q, ϕ);
Model checkingATLP: the main function.
 Returnmcheck(M, q, ϕ, ∅, ∅);
functionmcheck(M, q, ϕ,−→ω ,B);
Returns “true” iff ϕ plausibly holds inM, q. The current plausibility assumptions are specified by a sequence
−→ω = [〈ω1, q1〉, . . . , 〈ωn, qn〉] of plausibility terms with interpretation points. The set of agents which are
assumed to play rational are denoted byB.
cases ϕ ≡ p, ϕ ≡ ¬ψ, ϕ ≡ ψ1 ∧ ψ2 : proceed as usual;
case ϕ ≡ (set-pl ω′)ψ : return(mcheck(M, q, ψ, [〈ω′, q〉], B));
case ϕ ≡ (refn-pl ω′)ψ : return(mcheck(M, q, ψ,−→ω ⊕ 〈ω′, q〉, B));
case ϕ ≡ PlAψ : return(mcheck(M, q, ψ,−→ω ,A));
case ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉 gψ, where ψ includes some 〈〈B〉〉 : Label all q′ ∈ Q , in which
mcheck(M, q, ψ,−→ω ,B) returns “true”, with a new proposition yes. Return
mcheck(M, q, 〈〈A〉〉 gyes,−→ω ,B);
case ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉 gψ, where ψ includes no 〈〈C〉〉 : Remove all operators Pl , Ph ,
(set-pl ·) from ψ (they are irrelevant, as no cooperation modality comes fur-
ther), yielding ψ′. Return solve(M, q, 〈〈A〉〉 gψ′,−→ω ,B);
cases 〈〈A〉〉2ψ and 〈〈A〉〉ψ1Uψ2 : analogously ;
end case
function solve(M, q, ϕ,−→ω ,B);
Returns “true” iffϕholds inM, q under plausibility assumptions specified by−→ω and applied toB. We assume
thatϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉2ψ, whereψ is a propositional formula, i.e., it includes no 〈〈B〉〉,Pl ,Ph , (set-pl ·).
 Label all q′ ∈ Q , in which ψ holds, with a new proposition yes;
 Guess a strategy profile s;
 if plausiblestrat(s,M,−→ω ,B) then return( not
beatable(s[A],M, q, 〈〈A〉〉2yes,−→ω ,B));
else return( false);
Figure 8: Model checkingATLP
6.1.1 Model Checking LbaseATLP: Upper Bounds
Well-behaved CGSP. A detailed algorithm for model checking LbaseATLP for-
mulae in well- behaved concurrent game structures with plausibility is pre-
sented in Figure 8. Apart frommodelM , state q, and formulaϕ to be checked,
the input includes a plausibility specification vector −→ω and a set B of agents
which are assumed toplay rationally. Theplausibility vector−→ω = [〈ω1, q1〉, . . . , 〈ωn, qn〉]
is a sequence of plausibility terms together with states at which the terms are
evaluated; this is because we need to keep track of applications of the refine-
ment operators (refn-pl ·). The intuition is that the vector represents the
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function beatable(sA,M, q, 〈〈A〉〉γ,−→ω ,B);
Returns “true” iff the opponents can beat sA so that it does not enforce γ inM, q under plausibility assump-
tions specifiedby−→ω and imposedonB. Thepath formulaγ is of the form eψ,2ψ,ψUψ′ withpropositional
ψ,ψ′.
 Guess a strategy profile t;
 if plausiblestrat(t,M,−→ω ,B) and t|A = sA then
− M ′ := “trim”M , removing all transitions that cannot occur when t|B is
executed;
− return(mcheckCTL(M ′, q,¬Aγ));
else return( false);
function plausiblestrat(s,M,−→ω ,B);
Checks whetherB’s part of strategy profile s is part of some profile in
⋂
〈ω,q〉∈−→ω [[ω]]
q
M .
 return true if s|B ∈ ⋂〈ω,q〉∈−→ω [[ω]]qM |B ; and false otherwise.
Figure 9: Model checkingATLP
incremental plausibility updates. Moreover, by [〈ω1, q1〉, . . . , 〈ωn, qn〉] ⊕ 〈ω, q〉
we denote the vector [〈ω1, q1〉, . . . , 〈ωn, qn〉, 〈ω, q〉].
Since CTL model checking is linear in the number of transitions in the
model and the lengthof the formula [14] and as long as plausiblestrat(s,M, q, ω,B)
can be computed in polynomial time, we get thatmcheckATLP runs in time
∆P3 , i.e., the algorithm can be implemented as a deterministic Turing Ma-
chine making adaptive calls to an oracle of range ΣP2 = NP
NP. In fact, it
suffices to require that plausiblestrat(s,M, q, ω,B) can be computed in nonde-
terministic polynomial time, as the witness for plausiblestrat can be guessed
together with the strategy profile s in function solve, and with the strategy
profile t in function beatable, respectively. The intersection of plausibility
terms can also be neglected as the vector of plausibility terms can contain
at most l terms (length of the formula). Schematically, we can describe the
mainpart of the algorithmby ∃s¬(∃t): s is guessedfirst, then t is guessed (and
its answer is negated, so we have ∃s∀t). This schematic view will be useful in
Section 6.3 to give an intuition about the complexity of nested formulae to-
gether with quantification over strategic terms.
Proposition 23 LetM be a well-behaved CGSP, q a state inM , and ϕ a for-
mula of LbaseATLP(Agt,Π,Ω). Then M, q |= ϕ iff mcheckATLP(M, q, ϕ). The algo-
rithm runs in time∆P3 with respect to the number of transitions in the model and
the length of the formula.
Proof in Appendix D.1.
45 Technical Report IfI-08-03
Model CheckingATLP
Note that the requirement that the set of plausible strategies is given by Σ
is not a real restriction. Specific plausibility specification can always be set
using operator (set-pl ·), by adding a new plausibility term that denotes the
desired set of strategy profiles. The only restriction is that inclusion in the
set must be verifiable in nondeterministic polynomial time.
Finally, we observe that the complexity can be improved if only the strate-
gies of the proponents are restricted.
Proposition 24 Let γ be anLbaseATLP path formulawithout cooperationmodalities.
Then the model checking problem for formulae of the form PlA〈〈A〉〉γ is in ∆P2
(instead of∆P3 ).
Proof Sketch We consider the case ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉 hψ, where ψ includes no 〈〈C〉〉.
In solve a plausible strategy sA for A is guessed (NP-call). Then, in function
beatable themodel is directly trimmed according to sA (without guessing an-
other profile t) and the CTLmodel checking algorithm is executed. In this
case, function beatable can be executed in polynomial time. 
Corollary 25 Let ϕ ∈ LbaseATLP. If for each cooperation modality 〈〈A〉〉 occurring
in ϕ it is specified that only agents A′ where A′ ⊆ A play plausibly then model
checking is in∆P2 .
Pure CGS. This is a somewhat degenerate case because inLbaseATLP only prim-
itive plausibility terms can be used. With no such terms, (set-pl ·) and
(refn-pl ·) operators cannot be used, so all strategy profiles will be consid-
ered plausible in the evaluation of every subformula. In consequence,model
LbaseATLP(Agt,Π, ∅) can be done in the same way as forATL. Since model check-
ingATL lies inP [3] we get the following result.
Proposition 26 Let M be a CGS, q a state in M , and ϕ ∈ LbaseATLP(Agt,Π, ∅).
Model checking ϕ in M, q is in P with respect to the number of transitions in the
model and the length of the formula.
Proof Remove all PlA operators from ϕ and check whether M ′q, |=ATL ϕ
whereM ′ is the CGS obtained fromM by leaving outΥ,Ω, and [[·]]. 
SpecialClassesofModels. Wewill nowconsider the special case inwhich
each plausibility term refers to at most polynomially many strategies.
Definition 33 (BoundedModelsMc) Given a fixed constant c ∈ N we con-
sider the class Mc ⊆ CGSP (Agt,Π,Ω) of models such that for all M ∈ Mc,
ω ∈ ΩM , and q ∈ QM it holds that |[[ω]]qM | ≤ lc · mc where l (resp. m) denotes
the length of the input formula (resp. number of transitions ofM ).
DEPARTMENTOF INFORMATICS 46
REASONING ABOUT TEMPORAL PROPERTIES OF RATIONAL PLAY
Proposition 27 Let c ∈ N be a constant. Model checking LbaseATLP formulae with
respect to the class of well-behaved bounded modelsMc can be done in polynomial
time with respect to the number of transitions in the model and the length of the
formula.
Proof in Appendix D.1.
Even with arbitrarily many strategies the complexity can be improved if
the set of plausible profiles has a specific structure, namely if the set can be
(and is) represented in a rectangular way. Intuitively, such a set of profiles
can be represented by behavioral constraints [46]. That is, we restrict the
actions that can be performed independently for each state and agent, and
then consider all strategy profiles generated from the constrained repertoire
of actions.
Definition 34 (Rectangularity,Mrect) Let Sa ⊆ Σa be a set of strategies of
agent a. We say that Sa is rectangular if it is represented by a function d′a : QM →
P(Act) such that for all states q ∈ QM it holds that d′a(q) ⊆ da(q); then, Sa is
taken to be the set {sa ∈ Σa | ∀q ∈ QM (sa(q) ∈ d′a(q))}.
A set of collective strategies (resp. strategy profiles) SA ⊆ ΣA is rectangular if it
represented as a collection of rectangular sets of individual strategies. Then, SA is
to the Cartesian product of the individual sets, i.e., SA =
∏
a∈A Sa.
A set of plausibility terms Ω is rectangular in a modelM if all terms in ω ∈ Ω
have rectangular denotations [[ω]]qM . Finally, we say that aCGSPM is rectangular
if the setΥM is rectangular and terms Ω are rectangular inM . We denote the class
of such models byMrect.
Note, for example, that each ΣA is rectangular.
Proposition 28 Model checking LbaseATLP formulae in the classMrect can be done
in P with respect to the number of transitions in the model and the length of the
formula.
Proof The algorithm is very simple; we present the procedure forϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉2ψ
being in the scope of (set-pl ω) andPlB. Other cases are analogous.
Firstly, we model-check (set-pl ω)PlBψ recursively and label the states
where the answer was “true” with a new proposition yes. Then, we take [[ω]]qM
(recall that it is represented in a rectangular way, i.e., by function d′ : Agt ×
Q → P(Act)), and replace function d inM by d′′ such that d′′(a, q) = d′(a, q)
for a ∈ B and d′′(a, q) = d(a, q) for a /∈ B. Finally, we use any ATL model
checker to model-check 〈〈A〉〉2yes in the resulting model, and return the an-
swer. 
We observe that strategic combinations of rectangular plausibility terms
are also rectangular. In consequence, the results extends toL0ATLP in a straight-
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forward way, which will prove useful in Section 6.3.14
Lemma 29 If S ⊆ Σa (resp. S ⊆ ΣA) contains only a single strategy (resp. strat-
egy profile) then it is rectangular.
Lemma 30 Let Ω be a rectangular set of plausibility terms, then τ(Ω) is rectan-
gular as well.
Corollary 31 Model checking L0ATLP formulae in the classMrect can be done inP
with respect to the number of transitions in themodel and the length of the formula.
6.1.2 Model Checking LbaseATLP: Hardness and Completeness
Well-behavedCGSP. Weprove∆P3 -hardness through a reductionofSNSAT2,
a typical∆P3 -complete variant of the Boolean satisfiability problem. The re-
duction is done in two steps.
1. Firstly, we define a modification of ATLir [38], in which all agents are
required to play only uniform strategies. We call it “uniform ATLir”
(ATLuir in short), and show thatmodel checkingATLuir is∆P3 -complete
bymeans of a polynomial reduction of SNSAT2 toATLuirmodel check-
ing.
2. Then,wepoint out that each formula andmodel ofATLuir canbe equiv-
alently translated (in polynomial time) to aCGSP and a formulaLbaseATLP,
thus yielding a polynomial reduction of SNSAT2 to model checking
LbaseATLP.
Parts of our construction reuse techniques presented in [19, 27, 23, 28].
In “uniform ATLir” (ATLuir), where we assume that all the players have
limited information about the current state, and each agent can only use
uniform strategies (i.e., ones that assign same choices in indistinguishable
states). The syntax of ATLuir is the same as that of ATL, only cooperation
modalities are annotated with additional tags ir and u to indicate the imper-
fect information and recall, and uniformity of all agents’ strategies. The se-
mantics ofATLuir is defined over concurrent epistemic game structures (CEGS),
i.e. CGS extended with epistemic relations that represent indistinguishabil-
ity of states for agents. Details of the semantics and more thorough presen-
tation can be found in Appendix B. The following proposition summarizes
the complexity results from Appendix B.2.
Proposition 32 Model checkingATLuir is∆P3 -complete with respect to the num-
ber of transitions in the model and the length of the formula.
14 Recall, thatL0ATLP consists of all base formulae in which plausibility terms form τ(Ω) can be
used (instead of plain terms fromΩ only).
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Remark 33 We have thus proven that checking strategic abilities when all play-
ers are required to play uniformly is∆P3 -complete (that is, harder than ability com-
pared with the worst line of events captured by ATLir formulae, which is “only”
∆P2 -complete). We believe it is an interesting result with respect to verification of
various kinds of agents’ abilities under incomplete information. We note that the
result from [31] for extensive games with incomplete information can be seen as a
specific case of our result, at least in the class of games with binary payoffs.
Nowwe showhowATLuirmodel checking can be reduced tomodel check-
ing of LbaseATLP. We are given a CEGSM , a state q inM , and an ATLuir formula
ϕ. Let Σu be the set of all uniform strategy profiles inM . We take CGSPM ′
asM (sans epistemic relations) extended with plausibility mapping [[·]] such
that [[ω]]q = Σu. Then:
M, q |=ATLuir 〈〈A〉〉
u
irϕ iff M
′, q |=ATLP (set-pl ω)Pl 〈〈A〉〉ϕ,
which completes the reduction.
Remark 34 We note in passing that, technically, the size of the resulting model
M ′ is not entirely polynomial. M ′ includes the plausibility set Υ, which is expo-
nential in the number of states inM (since it is equal to the the set of all uniform
strategy profiles inM ). This is of course the case whenwewant to storeΥ explicitly.
However, checking if a strategy profile is uniform can be done in time linear wrt the
number of states inM , so an implicit representation ofΥ (e.g., the checking proce-
dure itself) requires only linear space.
As a result of this and Proposition 23, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 35 Model checking LbaseATLP for well-behaved CGSP’s is ∆P3 -complete
with respect to the number of transitions in the model and the length of the for-
mula.
For the special case when only the proponents have to follow plausible
strategies, a reduction frommodel checkingATLir (instead ofATLuir) is suf-
ficient. Since model checkingATLir is∆P2 -complete [38, 28], we get the fol-
lowing.
Theorem 36 LetL the subset ofLbaseATLP in which every cooperationmodality 〈〈A〉〉
occurs in the scope of PlB with B ⊆ A. Then, model checking L in the class of
well-behavedCGSP’s is∆P2 -complete.
Proof sketch The inclusion in ∆P2 has been already shown in Section 6.1.1.
We prove the lower bound by a reduction of model checking Schobbens’
ATLir [38] to model checking of our sublanguage L. Let M be a CEGS, q
a state inM , and ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉irγ a formula ofATLir. Moreover, let ΣuA be the set
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of all strategy profiles inM that are uniform for A. We take CGSPM ′ asM
(sans epistemic relations) extended with plausibility mapping [[·]] such that
[[ω]]q = ΣuA. Then:
M, q |=ATLir 〈〈A〉〉irγ iff M
′, q |=ATLP (set-pl ω)Pl 〈〈A〉〉γ,
which completes the reduction. 
PureCGSandSpecialClassesofModels. In order to show lower bounds
for model checking LbaseATLP for pure concurrent game structures, well-behaved
boundedmodels, and rectangularmodels, we observe thatATL is a subset of
LbaseATLP even if the latter does not use plausibility terms – and model checking
ATL isP-complete [3]. Thus, we conclude with the following.
Theorem 37 Let c ∈ N be a constant. Model checking LbaseATLP with respect to
well-behaved bounded models Mc, rectangular models Mrect, and pure CGS’s is
P-complete.
6.2 Model Checking LATLPATLI
Here, we show that model checking ATLP with plausibility terms based on
ATLI is also∆P3 -complete. Note that the only primitive terms occurring in
formulae of ATLPATLI are used to simulate strategic terms of ATLI (which
denote individual strategies of particular agents. Thus, the results in this sec-
tion refer to model checking with rectangular CGSP’s.
6.2.1 Model Checking LATLPATLI : Upper Bound
The algorithm in Figure 8 uses abstract plausibility terms but it can also be
used for ATLI-based plausibility terms presented in Section 4.3. In [30] it
was shown that the model checking problem for ATLI is polynomial with
respect to the number of transitions and length of the formula. Thus, we get
another immediate corollary of Proposition 23.
Proposition 38 Model checking ATLP with ATLI-based plausibility terms in
rectangular well-behaved CGSP’s is in ∆P3 with respect to the number of transi-
tions in the model and the length of the formula.
In Section 4.4 we have used L1ATLP formulae to characterize game theoretic
solution concepts. For this purpose it was not necessary to have hard-wired
plausibility terms in the language. Indeed, the absence of such terms posi-
tively influences the model checking complexity of higher levels ofATLP.
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6.2.2 Model Checking LATLPATLI : Hardness and Completeness
Like in Section 6.1.2, we show the lower bound by a reduction from model
checkingATLuir. That is, we demonstrate how uniformity of strategy profiles
can be characterized by formulae of ATLI for a relevant class of concurrent
game structures. The actual reduction is quite technical and can be found
in Appendix C. The following result is an immediate corollary of Proposi-
tion 50, presented in Appendix C.
Theorem 39 Model checking LbaseATLP with ATLI-based plausibility terms is∆P3 -
complete with respect to the number of transitions in the model and the length of
the formula.
Moreover, if plausibility restrictions apply only to proponents, then the
complexity improves (the proof is analogous to Theorem 36).
Theorem 40 Let L the subset of LATLPATLI in which every cooperation modality
〈〈A〉〉 occurs in the scope of PlB with B ⊆ A. Then, model checking L in the class
of well-behaved rectangularCGSP’s is∆P2 -complete.
Proof sketch Weprove the lower bound (again) by a reductionofmodel check-
ing ATLir to model checking L. The reduction is very similar to the one
shown in Appendix C except that only the “verifier” decides upon the val-
ues of the propositions (cf. [27]). 
6.3 Model Checking LkATLP
In this sectionwepresent our results regarding themodel checking complex-
ity of the full logic LATLP. The complexity depends on both the nesting level
of ATLP formulae and on the structure and alternations of strategic quan-
tifiers. Before we state our results we introduce some additional definitions
needed to classify such complex formulae.
6.3.1 Classifying LATLP Formulae: SomeDefinitions
The complexity of model checking formulae in LATLP does not only depend
on the actual nesting depth of plausibility terms but also on the structure of
strategic quantifiers used inside (set-pl ·) and (refn-pl ·) operators. The lat-
ter structure is quite complex and cannot solely be described by the number
of quantifiers. Often, a specific position of quantifiers can be used to com-
bine two “guessing” phases, improving complexity.
Firstly, not the number of quantifiers is important but rather the num-
ber of alternations. We introduce function ALT : {∃,∀}+ → {∃,∀}+ which
modifies a word over {∃,∀} such that each quantifier following a quantifier
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of the same type is removed; for example, ALT(∃∀∀∀∃∀) = ∃∀∃∀. Moreover,
existential quantifiers at the beginning and end of a quantifier series can,
under some conditions, be ignored without changing the model checking
complexity. For example, let us assume that the first quantifier is existen-
tial. Then it follows a guess of the proponents (resp. opponents) strategy
and both guesses can be combined. Analogously, an existential quantifier at
the end usually follows another existential guess. To take these issues into
account, we define function RALT : {∃,∀}+ → Z that counts the number of
the relevant alternations of quantifiers in a sequence:
RALT(
−→
Q) =

n if ALT(
−→
Q) = Q1 . . . Qn andQ1 6= ∃ 6= Qn;
n− 1 if ALT(−→Q) = Q1 . . . Qn andQ1 = ∃ xorQn = ∃;
n− 2 if ALT(−→Q) = Q1 . . . Qn andQ1 = ∃ = Qn and n > 2;
−1 else.
Function RALT characterizes the “hardness” of the outermost level in a
given term. The next two functions take into account the recursive structure
of terms, due to possibly nested (set-pl ·) or (refn-pl ·) operators. Firstly,
UO(ϕ) returns the set of all the update operations (set-pl ω) and (refn-pl ω)
within formula ϕ. Secondly, ql takes a set of update operations and returns
the quantifier level in these operations as follows:
ql(S) =

maxs∈S ql({s}) if |S| > 1
ql(UO(ϕ′)) if S = {(Op σ.ϕ′)}
RALT(Q1 . . . Qn) + ql(UO(ϕ′)) if S = {(Op σ.Q1σ1 . . . Qnσnϕ′)} and
(ϕ′ 6∈ L0ATLP(Agt,Π,Var,Var) orQn = ∀)
RALT(Q1 . . . Qn) + ql(UO(ϕ′)) + 1 if S = {(Op σ.Q1σ1 . . . Qnσnϕ′)} and
ϕ′ ∈ L0ATLP(Agt,Π,Var,Var) andQn = ∃
0 if S = ∅ or (S = {(Op ω)} and ω ∈ Ω)
where (Op ·) is either (set-pl ·) or (refn-pl ·).
The intuition behind ql is that it determines the maximal sum of relevant
alternations in each sequence of nestedupdate operators (set-pl ·), (refn-pl ·).
Intuitively, the nested operators represent a tree. Given an LkATLP formula
we add arcs from the root of the tree to nodes representing update opera-
tors operators in the kth level. Then, from such a new node representing
(set-pl ω) or (refn-pl ω), we add arcs to nodes representing update opera-
tors inside ω (i.e., on the k − 1th level) and so on. Leaves of the tree consist
of nodes representing operators whose terms contain no further update op-
erators. Now, each node represented by e.g. (set-pl σ.Q1σ1 . . . Qnσnϕ′) is
labeled by RALT(Q1 . . . Qn). Function ql returns the maximal sum of such
numbers along all paths from the root to some leaf.
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Given an operator (set-pl σ.Q1σ1 . . . Qnσnϕ′) on the second to last level
without hard-wired plausibility term (i.e., for ϕ′ ∈ L0ATLP(Agt,Π,Var,Var))
andwhich endswith an existential quantifier ∃, the very operatorQn cannot
be ignored in the calculation of the characteristic number, as it is usually
done. The reason for that is that model chekcing ϕ′ can be done in P (cf.
Corollary 31) and this does not allow to combine the existential quantifier
of the last strategic term with another one. This is reflected in the third case
of the definition of ql.
Definition 35 (Level i Formula) We say that ϕ is a level i formula iff
ql(UO(ϕ)) = i.
Example 18 Formula:
ϕ ≡ (set-pl σ.∀σ1∃σ2∃σ3(set-pl σ.∀σ′1∃σ′2∃σ′3∀σ′4ϕ′′))Pl 〈〈A〉〉 hp
is 4-level since UO(ϕ) = {(set-pl σ.∀σ1∃σ2∃σ3(set-pl σ.∀σ′1∃σ′2∃σ′3∀σ′4)ϕ′′)}
and ql(UO(ϕ)) = RALT(∀∃∃) + ql(UO(S)) = 1 + 3 = 4 where S =
{(set-pl σ.∀σ′1∃σ′2∃σ′3∀σ′4)ϕ′′} and ql(UO(S)) = RALT(∀∃∃∀) + ql(UO(ϕ′′)) =
3 + 0where UO(ϕ′′) = ∅.
Moreover, (set-pl σ.∀σ1∃σ2∃σ3(set-pl σ.∀σ′1∃σ′2∀σ′3∃σ′4)ϕ′′)Pl 〈〈A〉〉 hp is a 4-
level formula as well.
6.3.2 Model Checking LkATLP: Upper Bounds
Plausibility terms are quite important for the base languageLbaseATLP; it does not
make much sense to consider the logic without them. In fact, when LbaseATLP
formulae are considered in the context of pureCGS’s, thewhole logic degen-
erates to pureATL. This observation does not apply to higher levels ofATLP
anymore. Indeed, all characterizations of game theoretic solutions concepts
that we have presented are expressed as L1ATLP formulae without hard-wired
terms. Moreover – as we will see – not using hard-wired terms yields an im-
provedmodel checking complexity.
Belowwe state themain results of this section. The intuition is the follow-
ing. For each level i formula we have i quantifier alternations; in addition to
that, in each level there can be two more implicit quantifiers due to the co-
operationmodalities (there is a plausible strategy of the proponents such that
for all plausible strategies of the opponents . . . ). It must also be ensured that
the quantifiers of two nested levels are separated from each other, otherwise
they can be combined; the termmax{0, k − i− 1} accounts for that.
Theorem 41 (Model Checking LkATLP in Pure CGS) For k ≥ 1, i ≥ 0 let ϕ
be a level-i formula ofLkATLP(Agt,Π, ∅). Moreover, letM be aCGS, and q a state in
M . Then, model checkingM, q |= ϕ can be done in time∆Pi+2k+1−max{0,k−i−1}.
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Proof in Appendix D.2.1.
Note, that the restriction to pureCGS is essential because defining a given
set of strategies Υ might require checking whether a strategy is plausible in
the final nesting stage. And that case the advantage of not havinghard-wired
plausibility terms would vanish and the complexity would increase. So, if
plausibility terms are available the last level of an ATLP formula cannot be
verified in polynomial time anymore (according to Corollary 31). The com-
plexity can increase as shown in the following result.
Theorem 42 (Model Checking LkATLP inWell-Behaved CGSP) Let ϕ be
a level-i formula of LkATLP(Agt,Π,Ω), M a well-behaved CGSP, and q a state in
M . Model checkingM, q |= ϕ can be done in∆Pi+2(k+1)+1−max{0,k−i}.
Proof in Appendix D.2.1.
6.3.3 Model Checking LkATLP: Hardness and Completeness
As it turns out,model checkingLATLP, and even eachLkATLP for k ≥ 1 is in gen-
eral PSPACE-complete. To show the lower bounds for LkATLP (with arbitrary
k ≥ 1) we show thatL1ATLP isPSPACE-hard, implying that all logicsLkATLP (for
k ≥ 1) are PSPACE-hard too. That the general model checking problem for
LATLP formulae is in PSPACE follows directly from the algorithm shown in
Figure 8.
The hardness proof, similar to the one for LATLPATLI is rather technical and
can be found in Appendix D.2.2. As a corollary of Proposition 52, we get the
following.
Theorem 43 (LkATLP is PSPACE-complete) Themodel checking problems for
LATLP and for LkATLP (for each k ≥ 1) arePSPACE-complete.
Proof Easiness is immediate since the model checking algorithm presented
in Figure 8 can be executed in polynomial space with respect to the input
(cf. Theorem 41 and Proposition 26). Hardness is shown by the polynomial
space reduction fromQSAT (Proposition 52). 
Finally, we turn to classes inwhich the number of alternations is restricted
by a fixed upper bound, andwe conjecture that themodel checking problem
for i-level formulae of LkATLP is in fact complete in its complexity classes de-
termined in Theorems 41 and 42.
Conjecture 44 Let ϕ be a level-i formula of LkATLP(Agt,Π, ∅), k ≥ 1, i ≥ 0.
Moreover, letM be a CGS, and q a state inM . Then, model checkingM, q |= ϕ is
∆Pi+2k+1−max{0,k−i−1}-complete.
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Conjecture 45 Letϕ be a level-i formula ofLkATLP(Agt,Π,Ω),M awell-behaved
CGSP, and q a state inM . Model checkingM, q |= ϕ is∆Pi+2(k+1)+1−max{0,k−i}-
complete.
6.4 Summary of Complexity Results
Throughout Section 6, we have analyzed the model checking complexity of
LATLP. The base language was shown to lie in ∆P3 with both abstract and
ATLI-based plausibility terms. We also proved that model checking both
logics is complete regarding this class. The complexity of model checking
LkATLP formulae was shown to depend on three factors:
1. The nesting level k of plausibility terms;
2. the quantifier level; and
3. whether abstract plausibility terms were present or not.
The quantifier level is influenced by the number of alternations and with
which quantifiers – existential or universal – sequences start and end. In gen-
eral, an i-level LkATLP formula without plausibility terms was shown to be in
∆Pi+2k+1−max{0,k−i−1}
where its counterpart with hard-wired terms was marginally more difficult
to check:
∆Pi+2(k+1)+1−max{0,k−i}.
The results for formulae without (resp. with) primitive plausibility terms are
summarized in Figure 10 (resp. Figure 11).
Note that all our game theoretic characterizations could already be ex-
pressed by L1ATLP formulae without hard-wired terms.
7 Conclusions
We proposed a logic in which one can study the outcome of rational play
in a logical framework, under various rationality criteria. Although solving
game-like scenarios with help of various solution concepts is arguably the
main application of game theory, to our knowledge, there has been very lit-
tle work on this issue. We are not discussing themerits of one rationality cri-
terion or the other, nor the pragmatics of using particular criteria to predict
the actual behaviour of agents. Our aim was to propose a conceptual tool in
which the consequences of accepting one or another criterion can be stud-
ied.
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0 1 2 . . . i . . . unbounded
LbasicATLP P - - - - . . . -
L0ATLP P - - . . . - . . . -
L1ATLP ∆P3 ∆P4 ∆P5 . . . ∆Pi+3 . . . PSPACE
L2ATLP ∆P4 ∆P6 ∆P7 . . . ∆P5+i−max{0,1−i} . . . PSPACE
... . . .
...
LkATLP
i > k + 1
∆Pk+2 ∆
P
k+4 ∆
P
k+6 . . . ∆
P
i+2k+1−max{0,k−i−1} . . . PSPACE
Figure 10: Summary of the model checking results for pure concurrent
game structures (i.e., without hard-wired plausibility terms). AllP,∆P3 , and
PSPACE results are completeness results.
0 1 2 . . . i . . . unbounded
LbasicATLP ∆P3 - - . . . - . . . -
L0ATLP ∆P3 - - . . . - . . . -
L1ATLP ∆P4 ∆P6 ∆P7 . . . ∆Pi+5−max{0,1−i} . . . PSPACE
L2ATLP ∆P5 ∆P7 ∆P9 . . . ∆P7+i−max{0,2−i} . . . PSPACE
...
...
LkATLP
i > k
∆Pk+3 ∆
P
k+5 ∆
P
k+7 . . . ∆
P
i+2(k+1)+1−max{0,k−i} . . . PSPACE
Figure 11: Summary of the model checking results in well-behaved CGSP’s.
All∆P3 and PSPACE results are completeness results.
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We believe that the logic we propose provides much flexibility and mod-
eling power. The results presented in Sections 5 and 6 also suggest that the
expressive power of the language is quite high. Our main technical results
are as follows:
ATLP: The very definition of the logic ATLP in Section 4 and the study of
its expressive power in Section 5.1.
Classical Solution Concepts: There are several classical solution concepts
for extensive games: Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium, undominated strategies, and Pareto optimality. We show, by
relating models of our logic (CGSP’s) to extensive form games, that these
solution concepts can be formulated as formulae in ATLP (in fact, al-
ready in L1ATLP). This is shown in Section 5.2
General Solution Concepts: While the classical solution concepts for games
are formulated using payoffs (which was the reason to extend models
by additional propositions), we propose to formulate generalized solu-
tion concepts as formulae in our logicATLP. More precisely, we propose
to use LATL-path formulae ηi as winning conditions for agent i. Thus,
instead of computing payoffs in an extensive form game, we consider
CGSPmodels plus a vector of LATL-path formulae ηi (representing the
payoff for agent i). We demonstrate L1ATLP formulae that correctly ex-
press in ATLP our generalized solution concepts. This is elaborated in
Section 3.5.
Model Checking in ATLP: Anextensive studyof themodel checking com-
plexity in several classes of models and variants of the language is pre-
sented in Section 6. On theway,we also define another interesting vari-
ant ofATL (where both proponents and opponents are required to use
only uniform strategies) and we establish its model checking complex-
ity.
Our ultimate goal is to come up with a logic that would allow us to study
strategies, time, knowledge, andplausible/rational behaviour under bothper-
fect and imperfect information. However, putting so many dimensions in
one framework at once is usually not a good idea – even more so in this
case because the interaction between abilities and knowledge is non-trivial
(cf. [29, 24, 22]). In [10], we have investigated time, knowledge and plausibility.
In this article, we studied strategies, time and rationality. We hope to integrate
both views into a single powerful framework in the future.
We would like to thank two anonymous referees for pointing out several
issues that helped us to improve (and shorten) this article.
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Appendix
A BargainingwithDiscount
In Example 7 we presented bargaining with discount. After each round the
worth of the goods is reduced by δi. In round t the goods have a value of
r(δti). Because we use a rounding function r, there is aminimal round T such
that r(δT+1i ) = 0 for i = 1 or i = 2. We can treat this case as finite horizon
bargaining game [40, 33].
Now, consider the case that ai’s opponent, denoted by a−i, is the offerer
in T . It can offer 0 and ai should accept, because in the next round the goods
are worthless for ai.
On the other hand, if ai is offerer in T we have to distinguish two cases. If
r(δT+1−i ) = 0 then following the same reasoning as before ai can offer 0 to a−i.
In the other case, namely r(δT+1−i ) 6= 0, we consider the subsequent round
T + 1 in which a−i takes the role as offerer and can successfully offer 0 to i.
Now, it is possible to solve the game starting from the end. Solutions for
δ1 = δ2 can be found in the literature [33]. Here, we recall the idea for differ-
ent discount rates.
At first, let a1 be the last offerer and r(δT+12 ) = 0. This implies, that T
is even (the initial round is 0). In T , a1 offers 〈1, 0〉 and a2 accepts. Knowing
this, in T−1 agent a2 can offer 〈δ1, 1−δ1〉, since in the next round the value of
the good for a1 would become reduced by δ1. Following the same reasoning,
in T −2 a1 could successfully offer 〈1− δ2(1− δ1), δ2(1− δ1)〉. Finally, in round
t = 0 a1 can offer 〈ζ, 1− ζ〉where
ζ := (1− δ2)
T
2 −1∑
i=0
(δ1δ2)i + (δ1δ2)
T
2 = (1− δ2)1− (δ1δ2)
T
2
1− δ1δ2 + (δ1δ2)
T
2
Secondly, consider the case inwhich a2 is the last offerer inT and r(δT+11 ) =
0. This time T is odd but the reasoning stays the same. In round 0 a1 can offer
〈ζ ′, 1− ζ ′〉where
ζ ′ := (1− δ2)1− (δ1δ2)
T+1
2
1− δ1δ2
B UniformATLir
In this section, we introduce and investigate the logic of “uniform ATLir”
(ATLuir). We use the logic only for technical reasons, namely it provides the
intermediate step in the completeness proof for the complexity of model
checking ATLP. Still, we believe that the logic can be interesting in itself.
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Moreover, the technique we use for proving the completeness is interesting
too (and gives insight into the complexity aswell as the relationship between
the problemwe study and known complexity from game theory).
The idea is based on Schobbens’s ATLir [38], i.e., ATL for agents with
imperfect information and imperfect recall. There, it was assumed that the
coalitionA in formula 〈〈A〉〉irϕ canonlyuse strategies that assign same choices
in indistinguishable states (so called uniform strategies). Then, the outcome
of every strategy of A was evaluated in every possible behaviour of the re-
maining agents Agt \ A (with no additional assumption with respect to that
behaviour). In ATLuir, we assume that the opponents (Agt \ A) are also re-
quired to respond with a uniform memoryless strategy. The syntax of ATLuir is
the same as that ofATL, only cooperationmodalities are annotatedwith ad-
ditional tags ir and u to indicate the imperfect information and recall, and
uniformity of all agents’ strategies.
B.1 Semantics
The semantics ofATLuir can be defined as follows. Firstly, we definemodels as
concurrent epistemic game structures (CEGS), i.e. CGSwith epistemic relations
∼a⊆ Q × Q , one per agent. (The intended meaning of q ∼a q′ is that agent
a cannot distinguish between between states q and q′.) Secondly, we require
that agents have the same options in indistinguishable states, i.e., that q ∼a
q′ implies da(q) = da(q′). A (memoryless) strategy sA is uniform if q ∼a q′
implies saA(q) = s
a
A(q
′) for all q, q′ ∈ Q , a ∈ A. To simplify the notation, we
define [q]a = {q′ | q ∼a q′} to be the class of states indistinguishable from q for
a; [q]A =
⋃
a∈A[q]a collects all the states that are indistinguishable from q for
some member of the group A; finally, out(Q, sA) =
⋃
q∈Q out(q, sA) collects
all the execution paths of strategy sA from states in setQ.
Now, the semantics is given by the clauses below:
M, q |= p iff p ∈ pi(q)
M, q |= ¬ϕ iffM, q 6|= ϕ
M, q |= ϕ ∧ ψ iffM, q |= ϕ andM, q |= ψ
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉uir hϕ iff there is a uniform strategy sA such that, for every uni-
form counterstrategy tAgt\A, and λ ∈ out([q]A, 〈sA, tAgt\A〉),15 we have
M,λ[1] |= ϕ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉uir2ϕ iff there is a uniform strategy sA such that, for every
uniform counterstrategy tAgt\A, and λ ∈ out([q]A, 〈sA, tAgt\A〉), we have
M,λ[i] |= ϕ for all i = 0, 1, ...;
15 Note that the definition of concurrent game structures, that we use after [3], implies that
CGS are deterministic, so there is in fact exactly one such path λ.
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Figure 12: CEGSM2 for ϕ1 ≡ ((x1∧x2)∨¬y1)∧ (¬x1∨y1), ϕ2 ≡ z1∧ (¬z1∨y2).
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉irϕUψ iff there is a uniform strategy sA such that, for every
uniform counterstrategy tAgt\A, and λ ∈ out([q]A, 〈sA, tAgt\A〉), there is
i ∈ N0 withM,λ[i] |= ψ, andM,λ[j] |= ϕ for all 0 ≤ j < i.
B.2 Model Checking Complexity
We show the lower bound by reduction of SNSAT2, a typical∆P3 -complete
problem. We recall the definition of SNSATi after [32].
Definition 36 (SNSATi)
Input: p sets of propositional variablesXjr = {xj1,r, ..., xjk,r} for each j = 1, . . . , i;
p propositional variables zr, and p Boolean formulae ϕr in positive normal form
(i.e., negation is allowed only on the level of literals). Each ϕr involves only vari-
ables in
⋃i
j=1X
j
r ∪ {z1, ..., zr−1}, with the following requirement:
zr ≡ ∃X1r∀X2r∃X3r . . . QXir.ϕr(z1, ..., zr−1, X1r , . . . , Xir) where Q = ∀ (resp. Q =
∃) if i is even (resp. odd).
Output: The value of zp.
In this section we focus on SNSAT2 where we set X1r = Xr = {x1,r, ..., xk,r}
andX2r = Yr = {y1,r, ..., yk,r}.
Our reduction of SNSAT2 is an extension of the reduction of SNSAT pre-
sented in [27, 28]. That is, we construct the CEGS Mr corresponding to zr
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with two players: verifier v and refuter r. The CEGS is turn-based, that is,
every state is “governed” by a single player who determines the next tran-
sition. Each subformula χi1...il of ϕr has a corresponding state qi1...il inMr.
If the outermost logical connective of ϕr is ∧, the refuter decides at q0 which
subformulaχi ofϕr is to be satisfied, by proceeding to the “subformula” state
qi corresponding to χi. If the outermost connective is ∨, the verifier decides
which subformula χi ofϕr will be attempted at q0. This procedure is repeated
until all subformulae are single literals. The states corresponding to literals
are called “proposition” states.
The difference from the construction from [27, 28] is that formulae are
in positive normal form (rather than CNF) and that we have two kinds of
“proposition” states now: qi1...il refers to a literal consisting of some x ∈ Xr
and is governed by v; q¯i1...il refers to some y ∈ Yr and will be governed by r.
Now, the values of the underlying propositional variables x, y are declared at
the “proposition” states, and the outcome is computed. That is, if v executes
> for a positive literal, i.e. χi1...il = x, (or ⊥ for χi1...il = ¬x) at qi1...il , then
the system proceeds to the “winning” state q>; otherwise, the system goes
to the “sink” state q⊥. For states q¯i1...il the procedure is analogous. Models
corresponding to subsequent zr are nested like in Figure 12.16 “Proposition”
states referring to the same variable x are indistinguishable for v (so that he
has to declare the same value of x in all of them), and the states referring to
the same y are indistinguishable for r. A sole ATLuir proposition yes holds
only in the “winning” state q>. As in [27, 28], we have the following result
which concludes the reduction.
Proposition 46 The above construction shows a polynomial reduction ofSNSAT2
to model checkingATLuir in the following sense. Let
Φ1 ≡ 〈〈v〉〉uir(¬neg)Uyes, and
Φr ≡ 〈〈v〉〉uir(¬neg)U(yes ∨ (neg ∧ 〈〈∅〉〉uir h¬Φr−1)) for r = 2, . . . , p.
Then, we have zp iffMp, q
p
0 |=ATLuir Φp.
As for the upper bound, we note that there is a straightforward ∆P3 al-
gorithm that model-checks formulae of ATLuir: when checking 〈〈A〉〉uirTϕ in
M, q, it first recursively checks ϕ (bottom-up), and labels the states where ϕ
held with a special proposition yes. Then, the algorithm guesses a uniform
strategy sA and calls an oracle that guesses a uniform counterstrategy tAgt\A.
Finally, it trimsM according to 〈sA, tAgt\A〉, and calls a CTLmodel checker
to check formula AT yes in state q of the resulting model. This gives us the
following result.
16All states in themodel for zr are additionally indexed by r.
65 Technical Report IfI-08-03
FromATLuir toATLPwithATLI-Based Plausibility Terms
Theorem 47 Model checking ATLuir is∆P3 -complete with respect to the number
of transitions in the model and the length of the formula. It is∆P3 -complete even
for turn-basedCEGSwith at most two agents.
C FromATLuir to ATLPwith ATLI-Based Plau-
sibility Terms
The reduction of ATLuir model checking to model checking of ATLP
ATLI in
“pure” CGS is rather sophisticated. We do not present a reduction for full
model checking ofATLuir; it is enough to show the reduction for the kind of
models that we get in Appendix B.2 (i.e., turn-basedmodels with two agents,
two “final” states q>, q⊥, no cycles except for the loops at the final states, and
uncertainty appearing only in states one step before the end of the game, cf.
Figure 12).
Firstly, we reconstruct the concurrent epistemic game structureMp from
Section B.2 so that the last action profile is always “remembered” in the fi-
nal states. Then, we show how uniformity of strategies can be characterized
with a formula ofATLI extendedwith epistemic operators. Thirdly, we show
how the model and the formula can be transformed to get rid of epistemic
links and operators (yielding a “pure” CGS and a formula of “pure” ATLI).
Finally, we show how the resulting characterization of uniformity can be
“plugged” into an ATLP formula to require that only uniform strategy pro-
files are taken into account.
Adding More Final States to the Model. To recall, the input of ATLuir
model checking consists in our case of a concurrent epistemic game structure
Mp (like the one in Figure 12) and anATLuir formula Φp (cf. Proposition 46).
We begin the reduction by reconstructingMp toM ′p in which the last action
profile is “remembered” in the final states. The idea is based on the construc-
tion from [19, Proposition 16] where it is applied to all states of the system,
cf. Figure 13.
In our case, we first create copies of states q>, q⊥, one per incoming transi-
tion. That is, the construction yields states of the form 〈q, α1, . . . , αk〉, where
q ∈ {q>, q⊥} is a final state of the originalmodelMp, and 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 is the ac-
tionprofile executed just before the systemproceeded to q. Each copyhas the
samevaluationof propositions as the original state q, i.e., pi′(〈q, α1, . . . , αk〉) =
pi(q). Then, for each action α ∈ Act and agent i ∈ Agt, we add a new proposi-
tion i : α. Moreover, we fix the valuation of i : α inM ′p so that it holds exactly
in the final states that can be achieved by an action profile in which i exe-
cutes α (i.e., states 〈q, α1, ..., αi, ..., αk〉). Note that the number of both states
and transitions inM ′p is linear in the transitions ofMp. The transformation
produces modelM ′p which is equivalent toMp in the following sense. Let ϕ
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Figure 13: Memorizing the last action profile in a simple 2-agent system
be a formula ofATLuir that does not involve special propositions i : α. Then,
for all q ∈ Q :Mp, q |=ATLuir ϕ iffM
′
p, q |=ATLuir ϕ.
In M ′p, agents can “recall” their actions executed at states that involved
some uncertainty (i.e., states in which the image of some indistinguishabil-
ity relation ∼i was not a singleton). Now we can use ATLI (with additional
help of knowledge operators, see below) to characterize uniformity of strate-
gies.
Characterizing Uniformity in ATLI+K. We will now show that uni-
formity of a strategy can be characterized inATLI extended with epistemic op-
erators Ka (that we call ATLI+K. Kaϕ reads as “agent a knows that ϕ”. The
semantics ofATLI+K extends that ofATLI by adding the standard semantic
clause from epistemic logic:
M, q |= Kaϕ iffM, q′ |= ϕ for every q′ such that q ∼a q′.
We note that ATLI+K can be also seen as ATEL [47] extended with inten-
tions.
Let us now consider the following formula ofATLI+Knowledge:
uniform(σ) ≡ (strσ)〈〈∅〉〉2
∧
i∈Agt
∨
α∈d(i,q)
Ki〈〈∅〉〉 hi : α.
The reading of uniform(σ) is: suppose that profile σ is played (strσ); then, for
all reachable states (〈〈∅〉〉2), every agent has a single action (∧i∈Agt∨α∈d(i,q))
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that is determined for execution (〈〈∅〉〉 hi : α) in every state indistinguishable
from the current state (Ki). Thus, formula uniform(σ) characterizes the uni-
formity of strategy profile σ. Formally, for every concurrent epistemic game
structureM , we have thatM, q |=ATLI+K uniform(σ) iff [σ[a]] is uniform for
each agent a ∈ Agt (for all states reachable from q). Of course, only reach-
able statesmatter whenwe look for strategies that should enforce a temporal
goal.
Note that the epistemic operatorKa refers to incomplete information, but
σ is now an arbitrary (i.e., not necessarily uniform) strategy profile. We ob-
serve that the length of the formula is linear in the number of agents and
actions in themodel.
Translating Knowledge to Ability. To get rid of the epistemic opera-
tors from formula uniform(σ) and epistemic relations from model M ′p, we
use the construction from [23] (which refines that from [19, Section 4.4]).
The construction yields a concurrent game structure tr(M ′p) and anATLI for-
mula tr(uniform(σ)). The idea can be sketched as follows. The set of agents
becomes extendedwith epistemic agents ei (one per ai ∈ Agt), yieldingAgt′′ =
Agt∪Agte. Similarly, the set of states is augmentedwith epistemic states qe for
every q ∈ Q ′ and e ∈ Agte; the states “governed” by the epistemic agent ea
are labeled with a special proposition ea. The “real” states q from the original
model are called “action” states, and are labeled with another special propo-
sition act. Epistemic agent ea can enforce transitions to states that are indis-
tinguishable for agent a (see Figure 14 for an example).17 Then, “a knows ϕ”
can be rephrased as “ea can only effect transitions to epistemic states where
ϕ holds”. With some additional tricks to ensure the right interplay between
actions of epistemic agents, we get the following translation of formulae:
tr(p) = p, for p ∈ Π
tr(¬ϕ) = ¬tr(ϕ)
tr(ϕ ∨ ψ) = tr(ϕ) ∨ tr(ψ)
tr(〈〈A〉〉 hϕ) = 〈〈A ∪ Agte〉〉 h(act ∧ tr(ϕ))
tr(〈〈A〉〉2ϕ) = 〈〈A ∪ Agte〉〉2(act ∧ tr(ϕ))
tr(〈〈A〉〉ϕUψ) = 〈〈A ∪ Agte〉〉(act ∧ tr(ϕ))U(act ∧ tr(ψ))
tr(Kiϕ) = ¬〈〈e1, ..., ei〉〉 h(ei ∧ 〈〈e1, ..., ek〉〉 h(act ∧ ¬tr(ϕ))).
Note that the length of tr(ϕ) is linear in the length of ϕ and the number
of agents k. Two important facts follow from [23, Theorem 8]:
Lemma 48 For everyCEGSM and a formula ofATLuir that does not include the
17 The interested reader is referred to [23] for the technical details of the construction.
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Figure 14: Getting rid of knowledge and epistemic links
special propositions act, e1, . . . , ek, we haveM, q |=ATLuir ϕ iff tr(M), q |=ATLuir
tr(ϕ).
Lemma 49 For everyCEGSM , we haveM, q |=ATLI+K uniform(σ) iff tr(M), q |=ATLI+K
tr(uniform(σ)).
Putting the Pieces Together: the Reduction. We observe thatATLuir
can be seen as ATL where only uniform strategy profiles are allowed. An
ATLI formula that characterizes uniformity has been defined in the previ-
ous paragraphs. It can be now plugged into our “ATL with Plausibility” to
restrict agents’ behaviour in the way the semantics ofATLuir does. This way,
we obtain a reduction of SNSAT2 to model checking ofATLPATLI.
Proposition 50
zp iff tr(M ′p), q
p
0 |=ATLPATLI (set-pl σ.tr(uniform(σ)))Pl tr(Φp).
Proof. We have zp iff M ′p, q
p
0 |=ATLuir Φp iff tr(M
′
p), q
p
0 |=ATLuir tr(Φp)
iff tr(M ′p), q
p
0 |=ATLPATLI (set-pl σ.tr(uniform(σ)))Pl tr(Φp). 
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D SomeModel Checking Complexity Proofs
D.1 Results in Section 6.1
Proposition 23: Let M be a well-behaved CGSP, q a state in M , and ϕ a
formula of LbaseATLP(Agt,Π,Ω). Then M, q |= ϕ iff mcheckATLP(M, q, ϕ). The
algorithm runs in time∆P3 with respect to the number of transitions in the
model and the length of the formula.
Proof Function mcheck is called recursively, at most l times. All cases apart
from ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉 hψ where ψ includes no 〈〈C〉〉 (analogously for the other
temporal operators) can be performed in polynomial time. Now, there is a
nondeterministic Turing machine AB which implements function beatable:
Firstly, it guesses a strategy t possibly together with another witness neces-
sary for plausiblestrat (by assumption the latter is in NP) and verifies if t is
plausible, the verification can be done in polynomial time (by the same as-
sumption). Finally, if t is plausible AB has to perform CTLmodel checking
which lies inP.
It remains to show that there is a nondeterministic oracle Turingmachine
AS with oracleAB implementing solve. (Formally, themachine requires two
oracles, one answering the question whether s is plausible, and the other is
givenbyAB. However, the former is computationally less expensive then the
latter and can be ignored since we are interested in the oracle with the high-
est complexity.) AS works as follows: Firstly, it guesses a profile s (again possi-
bly together with a witness for plausiblestrat); secondly, it verifies whether s
is plausible and then calls oracleAB and inverts its answer. Altogether, there
are polynomial many calls to machine AABS ∈ NPNP. This renders the algo-
rithm to be in∆P3 . 
Proposition 27: Let c ∈ N be a constant. Model checking LbaseATLP formulae
with respect to the class of well-behaved boundedmodelsMc can be done in
polynomial time with respect to the number of transitions in themodel and
the length of the formula.
Proof sketch We modify the original ATLmodel checking procedure as fol-
lows. Consider the formula ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉γ where γ is a pure ATL path formula.
Let B be the set of agents assumed to play plausibly and let Υ 6= Σ be the
current set of plausible strategies described by some term and state. For each
sB ∈ Υ|B we remove fromM all transitions which cannot occur according to
sB, yieldingmodelMsB , and checkwhetherMsB , q |=ATL 〈〈A〉〉γ. We proceed
like this for all s ∈ Υ|B (there are only polynomiallymany). This procedure is
incorporated into ourATLPmodel checking algorithm and applied bottom
up. 
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D.2 Results in Section 6.3
D.2.1 Upper Bounds
First, we recall a basic complexity result that will be used in the rest of this
section. Then, we present proofs of upper bounds for model checking LkATLP
for pure CGS’s and well-behaved CGSP’s.
Remark 51 A relation R ⊆ ×k+1i=1Σ∗ (k ≥ 1) is called polynomial decidable
whenever there is a deterministic Turingmachine (DTM)which decides {(x, y1 . . . , yk) :
(x, y1 . . . , yk) ∈ R} in polynomial time; furthermore, R is called polynomial bal-
anced if there is a k ∈ N such that for all (x, y1 . . . , yk) ∈ R: |yi| ≤ |x|k for all
i = 1, . . . k.
For a language L and k ≥ 1 the following holds: L ∈ ΣPk if, and only if, there
is a polynomial decidable and balanced (k + 1)-ary relation R such that L = {x |
∃y1∀y2∃y3 . . . Qyk ((x, y1 . . . , yk) ∈ R)} where Q = ∀ (resp. Q = ∃) if k is odd
(resp. k even) [36, Corollary 2 of Theorem 17.8].
Theorem 41: Let ϕ be a level-i formula of LkATLP(Agt,Π, ∅), k ≥ 1, i ≥ 0.
Moreover, letM be aCGS, and q a state inM . Then,model checkingM, q |= ϕ
can be done in time∆Pi+2k+1−max{0,k−i−1}.
Proof By induction over k. In the following we restrict ourselves to (set-pl ·)
without loss of generality.
Case k = 1. Let ϕ be a level-i L1ATLP formula, (set-pl ω) an operator occur-
ring in ϕ such that l({(set-pl ω)}) = i and ω = σ.Q1σ1Q2σ2 . . . Qnσnϕ′
where
ϕ′ ∈ LbaseATLP(Agt,Π, {σ, σ1, . . . , σn}).
Note thatMs,s1,...,sn , q |= ϕ′ canbe checked inpolynomial time since all
constructible plausibility terms are rectangular and the representation
is directly given (see Corollary 31). Moreover, let q′ denote the state in
which ω is evaluated. W.l.o.g. we can assume that ϕ has the following
structure:
ϕ ≡ (set-pl ω)Pl 〈〈A〉〉2yes
Now, ϕ is true in M and q if and only if there is a plausible strategy
sA for A and no plausible strategy t with t|A = s such thatM ′, q |=CTL
¬A2yeswhereM ′ is the trimmedmodel ofM wrt t. In the following we
neglect the complexity needed to verify whether sA is plausible since
the method beatable also verifies this property and its complexity is as
least as high (cf. proof of Proposition 23). Thus, ϕ is true if, and only if
∃sA¬
(∃t (t ∈ [̂[ω]]q′ andR|=(M, q, sA, t,2yes)))
iff ∃sA¬
(∃tQ1s1Q2s2 . . . Qnsn (M t,s1,...,sn , q′ |= ϕ′ andR|=(M, q, sA, t,2yes)))
iff ∃sA∀tQ¯1s1Q¯2s2 . . . Q¯nsn (M t,s1,...,sn , q′ 6|= ϕ′ or ¬R|=(M, q, sA, t,2yes))
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where R|=(M, q, sA, t,2yes) = true iff t|A = sA andM ′, q |=CTL ¬A2yes
whereM ′ is the “trimmed”model ofM wrt t, and Q¯ is the dual operator
toQ.
Now, the latter conditions can be verified in polynomial time. We con-
sider thenumber of quantifier alternations. Subsequent strategieswhich
are quantified by quantifiers of the same type can be guessed together.
The sameholds if the sequence startswith existential quantifiers. These
strategies can be guessed together with strategy t. A quantifier level of
l({(set-pl ω)}) = i denotes that it is sufficient to alternatingly guess i
witnesses. We obtain the following structure:
∃sA∀xt∃x1∀x2 . . . Qxi
where Q = ∃ (resp. Q = ∀) if i is even (resp. odd). Where xi denotes a
witness for a strategy or several strategies if guessing can be combined.
Thus, according to Remark 51 checking whether ϕ is satisfied can be
determined in time Σi+2 and the complete model checking algorithm
for level-i L1ATLP formula can be performed in time ∆Pi+3 (there can be
polynomial many such constructs).
Induction step: k 7→ k + 1 (k > 1). Letϕbe a level-iLk+1ATLP formula and letω
be a term inϕof the formω = σ1.Q1σ1Q2σ2 . . . Qnσnϕ′ such that l((set-pl ω)) =
i. Furthermore, let RALT(Q1 . . . Qn) = j; then, lϕ′ := ql(UO(ϕ′)) = i− j
and ϕ′ is anLkATLP formula. Thus, by induction hypothesis we have that
ϕ′ can bemodel checked in time
∆Pr+1 where r := lϕ′ + 2k −max{0, k − lϕ′ − 1}.
Again, w.l.o.g. we can assume that ϕ has the following structure:
ϕ ≡ (set-pl ω)Pl 〈〈A〉〉2yes.
We proceed as in case k = 1. Firstly, a profile s is guessed, then a profile
t and it is checked whether t is plausible and coincides with s wrt A
and whether the trimmed model (wrt t) satisfies ¬A2yes. We obtain
the following structure:
∃sA¬
(
∃t (t ∈ [̂[ω]]q
′
andR|=(M, q, sA, t,2yes))
)
iff ∃sA¬
∃tQ1s1Q2s2 . . . Qnsn (M t,s1,...,sn , q′ |= ϕ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈∆Pr+1
and R|=(M, q, sA, t,2yes)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈P
)

SinceM t,s1,...,sn , q′ |= ϕ′ is invoked by a nondeterministic polynomial
Turing machine we can assume that its model checking problem can
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be solved in ΣPr instead of ∆Pr+1; the polynomial effort of the deter-
ministic machine can also be done by the invoking nondeterministic
machine. Hence to verifyM t,s1,...,sn , q′ |= ϕ′ witnesses according to
∃x1∀x2∃x3 . . . Qrxr
have to be guessed; then, the question whether ϕ is satisfied with re-
spect to the witnesses x1, . . . , xr can be solved in polynomial time.
Because RALT(Q1Q2 . . . Qn) = j it suffices to guess witnesses according
to the following structure:
∀x′1∃x′2∀x′3 . . .∀x′j .
If Q1Q2 . . . Qn would start (resp. end) with existential quantifiers the
corresponding witnesses could be guessed together with the one for
profile t (resp. witness x1). Putting things together the following wit-
nesses have to be guessed:
(?) ∃sA∀xt ∃x′1∀x′2∃x′3 . . .∃x′j ∀x1∃x2∀x3 . . . Q¯rxr
It remains to show that the number of alternations in (?) does never
exceed i+ 2(k + 1)−max{0, (k + 1)− i− 1}
We distinguish two cases (k + 1)− i− 1 ≤ 0 and (k + 1)− i− 1 > 0.
Case: k + 1− i− 1 ≤ 0. That is, k ≤ i. We are going to determine the
maximal possible number of alternations in (?).
Firstly, assume that j ≥ 1. That is the number of alternation is
given by 2 + j + r = i + 2(k + 1) − max{0, k − i + j − 1}. This
expression is maximal whenever k− i+ j − 1 ≤ 0. Because of k ≤ i
this is always the case for j = 1. In this case the formula has at
most
i+ 2(k + 1)−max{k + 1− i− 1} alternations.
For j = 0 there is at least one alternation less, since the witness xt
can be guessed together with x1.
Case: k + 1− i− 1 > 0. That is, k > i. Firstly, we consider the case
j ≥ 1. There are atmost i+2(k+1)−max{0, k−i+j−1} alternations,
where thenumber becomesmaximal for j = 1; i.e. wehave atmost
i+ 2(k + 1)−max{k + 1− i− 1} alternations.
Now, we consider the case j = 0. In this case there are at most
i+2(k+1)−1−max{0, k− i−1} alternations. Because of k > i, we
have that k− i−1 ≥ 0 and, hence i+2(k+1)−1−max{0, k− i−1}
is equivalent to i+ 2(k + 1)−max{0, (k + 1)− i− 1}.
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Thus, i+ 2(k + 1)−max{k + 1− i− 1} alternations denotes themax-
imal possible number of alternationswhichproofs our claim themodel
checking algorithm for level-i Lk+1ATLP can be performed in time
PΣ
P
i+2(k+1)−max{k+1−i−1} =∆Pi+2(k+1)+1−max{k+1−i−1}.

Theorem42: Letϕbe a level-i formula ofLkATLP(Agt,Π,Ω),M awell-behaved
CGSP, and q a state inM . Model checkingM, q |= ϕ is in∆Pi+2(k+1)+1−max{0,k−i}.
Proof The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 41. In comparison to the
claim of Theorem 41, 2k has changed to 2(k + 1) and max{0, k − i − 1} to
max{0, k − i}. The reason for this is that the final nesting (i.e. formulae in
LbaseATLP) might contain hard-wired terms and it can not be verified in polyno-
mial time anymore. This causes the change from k to k+1 (it requires to guess
sA and verify it against all responses t). However, now the complexity might
be increased too much since the final strategy sA of A could be guessed to-
gether with the next to last strategy t′ of the opponents (∃s′A¬(∃t′∃sA¬(∃t)))
if there is no further alternation between t′ and sA, caused by a plausibility
term. Such an “interfering” alternation is only possible if the given formula
is at least an level-k formula; this is reflected bymax{0, k − i}. 
D.2.2 PSPACE-completeness of LkATLP Model Checking
Weuse quantified satisfiability (QSAT) to showPSPACE-completeness ofmodel
checking LkATLP and LATLP.
Definition 37 (QSAT [36])
Input: A boolean formula ϕ in conjunctive normal with i variables x1, . . . , xi.
Output: True if ∃x1∀x2 . . . Qixi ϕ is satisfiable, false otherwise (whereQ = ∀ if i
is even, andQ = ∃ if i is odd).
Given an instanceϕofQSATweconstruct anL1ATLP formula θϕ and aCGSP
Mϕ (both are constructible in polynomial space regarding the length of ϕ)
such that ϕ is satisfiable if, and only if, Mϕ, q0 |= θϕ. In the following we
sketch the constructions which are based on the reduction of SNSAT2 to
model checking ATLuir proposed in Appendix B.2, and the translation of
ATLuir to LATLPATLI proposed in Appendix C.
Let ϕ ≡ ∃x1∀x2 . . . Qnxn ψ be an instance of QSAT. Firstly, we sketch the
construction of the CEGSM ′ϕ which will then be transformed into a CGSP
Mϕ. In comparison to the construction inAppendixB.2,we considern agents
one for each quantifier (in fact, we consider max{2, n} agents; however, for
the rest of this section we assume that n ≥ 2). The agent belonging to quan-
tifier i is named ai. Except for the proposition states the procedure is com-
pletely analogous to the construction given in Appendix B.2 where agent a2
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Figure 15: Construction of the intermediate model M ′ϕ for ϕ ≡
∃x1∀x2∃x3((x1 ∧ x2) ∨ ¬x3) ∧ (¬x1 ∨ x3).
is considered as refuter and a1 as verifier. (Alternatively, two additional agents
could be added.) The procedure at the proposition states changes as follows:
In such a state, say q, referring to a literal l, say l = xi, agent ai can decide on
the value of xi. Note again that the agent is required tomake the same choice
in indistinguishable states. In Figure 15 the construction is shown for the for-
mula ϕ ≡ ∃x1∀x2∃x3((x1 ∧ x2) ∨ ¬x3) ∧ (¬x1 ∨ x3). Finally, the modelMϕ is
obtained fromM ′ϕ by following the same steps as described in Appendix B.2.
Secondly, we construct formula θϕ from ϕ as follows:
θϕ ≡ (set-pl σ1.∀σ2∃σ3 . . . Qnσnχ)Pl 〈〈Agt〉〉 h>
where
χ ≡
 ∧
i=1,...,n
uniformiATLP(σi)
 ∧ (set-pl 〈σ1[1], . . . , σn[n]〉)Pl 〈〈∅〉〉3yes.
Next, wewill give the intuitionbehind θϕ. Firstly, it is easy to see thatPl 〈〈Agt〉〉 h>
is true whenever the set of plausible strategy profiles is not empty. Hence, the
actual set of strategies described by the preceding (set-pl ·) operator is not
particularly important, rather if some strategy is plausible or not.
Secondly, note that (set-pl 〈σ1[1], . . . , σn[n]〉) in χ describes a single strat-
egyprofile and that all individual strategies canbe considered independently
(the set is rectangular, cf. Definition 34 and Lemma 29). Furthermore, an in-
dividual strategy is mainly used to assign > or ⊥ to propositional variables
in the proposition states. (Except for agents a1 and a2 which also take on the
refuter and verifier role; they can also perform actions in non-proposition
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states.) Hence, a given strategyprofile canbe seen as a valuationof thepropo-
sitional variables.
Thirdly, we analyze χ with respect to a given profile σ := 〈σ1[1], . . . , σn[n]〉
taking into account the previous points. By formula uniformiATLP(σi) it is
ensured that agent i assigns the same valuation to propositions in indistin-
guishable states. Now, χ is true if the “winning state” q> is reached by fol-
lowing the strategy described by σ (it describes a unique path in the model).
In other words, χ is true if, and only if, the valuation described by σ satisfies
ϕ.
Finally, due to the previous observations, if ̂[[σ1.∀σ2∃σ3 . . . Qnσnχ]] is non-
empty it can be interpreted as follows: There is a valuation of x1 such that
for all valuations of x2 there is a valuation of x3, and so forth such that ϕ is
satisfied.
The following proposition states that the construction is correct.
Proposition 52 Let ϕ be aQSAT instance. Then it holds that ϕ is satisfiable if,
and only if,Mϕ, q0 |= θϕ whereMϕ and θϕ are effectively constructible from ϕ in
polynomial space with respect to the length of the formula ϕ.
Proof sketch Let ϕ be aQSAT instance. We use the construction above to ob-
tainM ′ϕ and θϕ where uniform
i
ATLP(σ) is obtained as follows: Firstly, we take
the ATLI +K formula uniform(σ|i) (where σ|i refers to agent i’s startegy in
σ) as described in Appendix C; then, we use the polynomial translation to
change knowledge to ability, yielding a pure ATLI formula. Finally, we use
the polynomial translation from ATLI to ATLP given in Section 5.1 (Proof
of Proposition 11) to obtain a pure ATLP formula uniformiATLP(σ). Hence,
the latter formula is true if agent i’s strategy contained in the complete pro-
file σ is a uniform strategy. This shows that θϕ can be constructed in polyno-
mial space.
ModelMϕ is obtained fromM ′ϕ by the same scheme. Firstly, the construc-
tion from [23] referred to in Appendix C is applied. Secondly, the resulting
CGS with intentions is transformed to a CGSP using the construction from
Section 5.1 (Proposition 11) again. The constructed modelMϕ is also poly-
nomial with respect to ϕ.
We get that ϕ is satisfiable if, and only if,Mϕ, q0 |= θϕ. 
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